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FAMILY IN THE BALANCE: BARTON V. BARR AND THE
SYSTEMATIC VIOLATION OF THE RIGHT TO FAMILY LIFE
IN U.S. IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT
DAVID BALUARTE*
ABSTRACT
The United States systematically violates the international
human right to family life in its system of removal of noncitizens.
Cancellation of removal provides a means for noncitizens to chal-
lenge their removal based on family ties in the United States, but
Congress has placed draconian limits on the discretion of immigra-
tion courts to cancel removal where noncitizens have committed
certain crimes. The recently issued U.S. Supreme Court decision in
Barton v. Barr illustrates the troubling trend of affording less
discretion for immigration courts to balance family life in removal
decisions that involve underlying criminal conduct. At issue was the
“stop-time rule” for measuring the requisite seven years of continu-
ous residence for LPR cancellation of removal. A sharply divided
court read the relevant statute very differently, and a five-justice
majority interpreted the stop-time rule to further limit the discre-
tion of immigration judges to consider noncitizens’ family ties as a
defense against removal. However, modern international law doc-
trine suggests that customary international law is the law of the
United States and should be applied to resolve questions of statu-
tory meaning under the Charming Betsy rule of statutory interpre-
tation. This Article lays plain the systematic nature of the violations
of the human right to family life in the U.S. system of removal and
argues that the U.S. Supreme Court erred when it failed to mitigate
this harm in Barton v. Barr.
INTRODUCTION
I. U.S. IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT AND FAMILY LIFE
A. The Creation of a Mandatory Deportation Regime
B. Cancellation of Removal and Its Limits
C. The Plenary Power Doctrine and Family Life
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II. THE INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHT TO FAMILY LIFE
A. The U.S. Deportation Regime Violates the Right to
Family Life
B. Balancing Family Life Against Sovereign Immigration
Authority
1. Immigrant Admissions and Family Life
2. Unauthorized Immigration and Family Life
3. Criminal Law Violations and Family Life
III. BARTON V. BARR CONTRAVENES CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL
LAW
A. Dispute over the Proper Interpretation of the Statute
B. The Supreme Court Resolves the Circuit Split
C. The Charming Betsy Rule of Statutory Interpretation
CONCLUSION
INTRODUCTION
The United States systematically violates the international hu-
man right to family life in its system of removal of noncitizens.1 The
Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) sets forth expansive criminal
grounds for inadmissibility and deportation which are applied against
noncitizens in removal proceedings.2 The regime established for dis-
cretionary relief from removal, known as cancellation of removal, pro-
vides paths for both lawful permanent residents (LPRs) as well as
undocumented immigrants to challenge their removal based on family
ties in the United States.3 However, Congress has placed draconian
limits on the discretion of immigration courts to cancel removal where
noncitizens have committed certain crimes.4 The practice of removing
noncitizens for criminal conduct without balancing the public safety
imperative against the impact of that removal on children, spouses
and other family members violates core human rights obligations.5
However, U.S. immigration law is all but impervious to a direct chal-
lenge of this nature, in part because the century-old plenary power
1. Wayne Smith, Hugo Armendariz, et al. v. United States, Case 12.562, Inter-Am.
Comm’n. on H.R., Report No. 81/10, ¶¶ 12, 66 (2010).
2. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(2), 1227(2).
3. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229b.
4. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1229B(a)–(b).
5. See Beharry v. Reno, 183 F. Supp. 2d 584, 597–99, 601 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) (citing the
Convention on the Rights of the Child and the duty to maintain family unity, accepted
by every organized government except the United States). The ability of Congress to
expel noncitizens stems from customary international law, thus should also be limited
by the well-recognized “need to harmonize domestic and international law.” Id. at 599.
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doctrine limits serious judicial scrutiny of all acts of Congress that
set the terms for the removal of noncitizens.6
The recently issued U.S. Supreme Court decision in Barton v.
Barr illustrates the troubling trend line towards less discretion for
immigration courts to balance family life in removal decisions that
involve underlying criminal conduct.7 In that case, a majority of the
Supreme Court Justices masked their blatant disregard for the
fundamental human rights of Barton’s family as a technical matter
of statutory interpretation.8 At issue was the “stop-time rule” for
measuring the requisite seven years of continuous residence for LPR
cancellation of removal.9 Characteristic ambiguity in provisions of
the INA led to a split among the circuits about the effect of certain
crimes during that seven-year period on eligibility for LPR cancella-
tion.10 What was a clear question of statutory interpretation for the
five-justice majority, was just as clearly a blatant misapplication of
well-established canons for the four-justice dissent.11 While the
dissent did provide some description of the deep family connections
that were at stake in Barton, an account at odds with the majority
narrative that only characterized Barton in terms of the crimes he
had committed, there was no suggestion that his family life should
influence the interpretation of the statute at issue.12 In this regard,
the dissent too erred in its otherwise well-reasoned analysis of the
cancellation of removal provision at issue in Barton.13
While rules of international law may prove ineffective in mount-
ing a direct challenge to the grave injustices embedded in the black
letter of the cancellation of removal statute, the Charming Betsy
rule of statutory interpretation urges the consideration of such rules
in resolving ambiguities in the law.14 Indeed, modern international
law doctrine suggests that customary international law is the law of
the United States and should be applied by federal courts in certain
6. Stephen H. Legomsky, Immigration Law and the Principle of Plenary Congres-
sional Power, 1984 SUP. CT. REV. 255, 305 (1984) [hereinafter Legomsky, Principle of
Plenary Congressional Power]; Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law After a Century of
Plenary Power: Phantom Constitutional Norms and Statutory Interpretation, 100 YALE
L.J.545,611(1990);Stephen H. Legomsky, Ten More Years of Plenary Power: Immigration,
Congress, and the Courts, 22 HASTINGS CONST.L.Q.925,926(1994)[hereinafter Legomsky,
Ten More Years of Plenary Power].
7. See Barton v. Barr, 140 S. Ct. 1442, 1448 (2020).
8. Id. at 1454.
9. Id. at 1447.
10. Id. at 1460, 1461 n.5.
11. Id. at 1454, 1462.
12. Id. at 1457 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
13. See Barton, 140 S. Ct. at 1460–61 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
14. See Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy (The Charming Betsy Case), 6 U.S. 64,
118 (1804).
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circumstances.15 Customary international law is commonly defined
as law that “results from a general and consistent practice of states
followed by them from a sense of legal obligation.”16 A prominent
line of jurisprudence urges federal courts to interpret statutory am-
biguities in a manner consistent with customary international law,
and the Charming Betsy rule of statutory interpretation is named
for the first such case.17
There is ample support in the law that a norm of customary
international law has emerged to require states to perform an indi-
vidualized consideration of the human right to family life in expulsion
decisions.18 While this rule of customary international law may not
provide the basis for a direct judicial challenge to eliminate abusive
provisions of the cancellation of removal statute, it certainly had a role
to play in Barton, where an interpretation of the stop-time rule that
was consistent with U.S. human rights obligations was possible under
Charming Betsy.19 In this way, the majority in Barton disregarded
(yet another) rule of statutory interpretation in its rush to punish
(yet another) noncitizen by tearing him away from his family.20
This Article will lay plain the systematic nature of the viola-
tions of the human right to family life that occur every day in the
U.S. system of removal and argue that the U.S. Supreme Court erred
when it failed to mitigate the harm perpetrated under this system
in Barton v. Barr. Part I will describe the changes in law that took
place in 1996 that established cancellation of removal for LPRs and
non-LPRs, and eliminated other major forms of discretionary relief
from removal. It will enumerate the various statutory provisions
that limit eligibility to these forms of relief and specify how this
statutory framework has created a system of mandatory removal for
noncitizens who have committed certain criminal offenses. Part I
will go on to describe the impact of this system of mandatory re-
moval on immigrant, mixed-migrant, and U.S. citizen families in the
United States in hopes of bringing the human impact of this abusive
regime into sharp relief. Finally, it will describe how the plenary
15. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 111(3), cmt. c (AM. L. INST. 1987) (stating that “[i]nternational law . . . [is] law of the
United States,” and that “[c]ourts in the United States are bound to give effect to in-
ternational law”).
16. Id. at § 102(2).
17. See The Charming Betsy Case, 6 U.S. at 118; see Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 677
(1900) (finding that “where there is no treaty, and no controlling executive or legislative
act or judicial decision, resort must be had to the customs and usages of civilized nations”);
see also Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 438 (1964).
18. See Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. at 677.
19. See Barton, 140 S. Ct. at 1447.
20. Id.
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power doctrine facilitates this criminalization and the accompanying
dehumanization of noncitizens and their families in the removal
context, notwithstanding some evolving limits on that doctrine.
The second part of this Article will argue that a customary
international law rule has emerged that requires the individualized
consideration of family life in any expulsion decision. This part will
begin with a presentation of Wayne Smith and Hugo Armendariz v.
United States, in which the Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights found that the United States systematically violated proce-
dural protections for immigrant families in its removal regime.21 It
will then provide a broader analysis of this rule of law, surveying
the decisions the UN Human Rights Committee and a substantial
body of jurisprudence from the European Court on Human Rights.
This review will examine jurisprudence in the family reunification
context, as well as expulsions of noncitizens for immigration and
criminal law violations. This comprehensive presentation under-
girds one of this Article’s principal arguments that a rule of custom-
ary international law compels states to consider the human right to
family life as part of any decision to expel a noncitizen away from
his or her nuclear family.
The third part of this Article will argue that the Supreme Court
erred in failing to consider customary international law in interpret-
ing the stop-time rule for LPR cancellation of removal in Barton v.
Barr. This part will first present the circuit split resolved by the
Court in Barton and consider the underlying decision of the Board
of Immigration Appeals (B.I.A.) that the Supreme Court effectively
affirmed.22 It will examine the Barton decision in detail, considering
both the rationale of the majority opinion and the contrary view
advanced by the dissent. This part will then describe how the Court
neglected to address the applicable rule of customary international
law elaborated in the prior section and demonstrate how the correct
application of the Charming Betsy rule of statutory interpretation
in this case would have changed the outcome to protect noncitizens’
human right to family life.
I. U.S. IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT AND FAMILY LIFE
It is widely recognized that family reunification is one of the
primary goals of U.S. immigration policy.23 This is perhaps best
21. See Wayne Smith, Hugo Armendariz, et al. v. United States, Case 12.562, Inter-
Am. Comm’n. on H.R., Report No. 81/10, ¶¶ 12, 66 (2010).
22. See Barton, 140 S. Ct. at 1447–48.
23. See WILLIAMA.KANDEL,CONG.RSCH.SERV., RL43145, FAMILY-BASEDIMMIGRATION
POLICY 20 (2018) (citing statements to this effect by both the 1981 Select Commission
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reflected in the amendments made to the INA by the 1965 Hart-
Celler Act, which established the contemporary regime for family-
based immigration.24 Immigration to unite families has remained
the most prominent feature of the U.S. immigration system since
the passage of that monumental legislation, and the commitment of
immigration policymakers to family reunification through immi-
grant admissions continued in the 1990s and 2000s.25 However, this
same time period was marked by a trend towards a draconian depor-
tation regime fueled by a restrictionist discourse obsessed with im-
migrant criminality.26 These concerns culminated in the passage of
the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) and
Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act
(IIRIRA) in 1996, which eliminated discretionary relief from re-
moval for noncitizens who committed certain crimes.27
The irony of a system that reunifies families in the United
States in recognition of the social importance of the family, but then
tears members of the family away for antisocial behavior without
on Immigration and Refugee Policy chaired by Theodore Hesburgh (the Hesburgh Com-
mission) and the 1995 U.S. Commission on Immigration Reform chaired by Barbara
Jordan (the Jordan Commission)).
24. Id. at 2; see also Kerry Abrams & R. Kent Piacenti, Immigration’s Family Values,
100 VA. L. REV. 629, 661–63 (2014) (detailing the ways in which the 1965 Act incorporated
the policy of family reunification); see also Catherine Lee, Family Reunification and the
Limits of Immigration Reform: Impact and Legacy of the 1965 Immigration Act, 30
SOCIO. F. 528, 529 (2015) (challenging the characterization that family reunification
policy as a uniquely modern political achievement of the civil rights era and examining
immigration policy during the exclusion era and show that family reunification has been
a crucial element of American immigration policy since the United States began regu-
lating immigration).
25. See RICHARD BOSWELL,ESSENTIALS OF IMMIGRATIONLAW 14 (3d ed. 2009); Miguel
Lawson & Marianne Grin, The Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649. 104 Stat.
4978, 33 HARV.INT’LL.J. 255, 257 (1992); Shane Dizon & Nadine K. Wettstein, Legal Immi-
gration and Family Equity Act, 1 Immigr. L. Serv. 2d (West) § 1:58 (2000); Johnny N.
Williams, Policy Change—Public Law 107-50, the Family Sponsor Immigration Act of
2002: Use of Substitute Sponsor if Visa Petitioner Has Died, 8 Immigr. L. Serv. 2d (West)
§ 2 (2002); see also KANDEL, supra note 23, at 9 (discussing the Child Citizen Protection
Act of 2002).
26. See BOSWELL, supra note 25, at 13; Carol Sanger, Immigration Reform and Control
of the Undocumented Family, 2 GEO.IMMIGR.L.J. 295, 316–17, 347 (1987) (explaining how
the 1986 Immigrant Reform and Control Act (IRCA) responded to concerns about unau-
thorized migrants living and working in the United States by criminalizing the act of
assisting unauthorized immigration to the United States, as well as the employment of
undocumented noncitizens); Warren R. Leiden & David L. Neal, Highlights of the U.S.
Immigration Act of 1990, FORDHAM INT’L. L.J. 328, 337 (1990) (describing how the 1990
Immigrant Act expanded the grounds for deportation while simultaneously limiting
relief from removal).
27. See Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA), Pub.
L. No. 104-208, § 304(a), 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-594 (1996) (codified as amended at 8
U.S.C. § 1229b); Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), Pub. L.
No. 104-32, § 442, 110 Stat. 1214, 1279 (1996) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1228).
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weighing the damage to the family unit merits attention. The fol-
lowing subsection will examine how the 1996 laws created a system
of mandatory removal by eliminating discretionary relief from removal
for noncitizens who commit “aggravated felonies.”28 It will describe
the evolution of that term as well as the human impact of laws that
mandate the removal of all noncitizens who commit this category of
offenses, notwithstanding their family ties. Cancellation of removal
was installed in 1996 as the primary framework to seek discretion-
ary relief from removal on account of family ties, and the next sub-
section will describe this framework and consider limitations on
that relief that aggravate the situation created by mandatory re-
moval. The last section will consider why this harsh system of re-
moval, which destroys families that often include U.S. citizen children
and other vulnerable family members, persists in a legal system
that purportedly protects fundamental substantive and procedural
due process rights.
A. The Creation of a Mandatory Deportation Regime
While criminal grounds for exclusion and deportation have long
been a feature of U.S. immigration regulation, there was a marked
increase in the breadth of these categories during the “war on drugs”
in the 1980s and ‘90s.29 In many ways mirroring the punitive nature
of criminal justice reforms of that era, for example in the form of
mandatory minimum federal sentences,30 immigration consequences
of criminal convictions also became increasingly harsh.31 Perhaps
most notable was the steady elimination of discretionary relief from
deportation for noncitizens who had been convicted of crimes codi-
fied in the INA as “aggravated felonies,” and the decision in 1996 to
eliminate all discretionary relief for that population.32 The human
impact was soon evident, with numerous accounts in the media of
long-term LPRs who had committed a crime in his or her youth that
suddenly required their mandatory removal.33 The effects of this
28. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act, Pub. L. No. 104-208,
§ 304(a), 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-594 (1996) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1229b).
29. Cf. Christopher Mascharka, Mandatory Minimum Sentences: Exemplifying the
Law of Unintended Consequences, 28 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 935, 967–68 (2001) (discussing
the “war on drugs”).
30. See id. at 936–38; see also César Cuauhtémoc Garcia Hernández, Deconstructing
Crimmigration, 51 U.C. DAV. L. REV. 197, 202 (2018).
31. Garcia Hernández, supra note 30.
32. Id.
33. See, e.g., HUM. RTS. WATCH, FORCED APART: FAMILIES SEPARATED AND IMMIGRANTS
HARMED BY UNITED STATES DEPORTATION POLICY 81 (2007), https://www.hrw.org/report
/2007/07/16/forced-apart/families-separated-and-immigrants-harmed-united-states-depor
tation [https://perma.cc/RMA2-SJUV].
40 WM. & MARY J. RACE, GENDER & SOC. JUST. [Vol. 27:033
regime on immigrant families soon came into focus, though over time,
the U.S. system of immigration has become desensitized to its brutal
consequences for family life.34
The first feature of the mandatory removal regime to emerge
was a category of criminal law violations defined under immigration
law as “aggravated felonies” which triggered severe immigration
consequences.35 The term aggravated felony was first introduced in
1988 by the Anti-Drug Abuse Act (ADAA),36 which defined it as
“murder, any drug trafficking crime . . . or any illicit trafficking in
any firearms or destructive devices . . . or any attempt or conspiracy
to commit any such act, committed within the United States.”37 The
1990 Immigration Act expanded the definition of aggravated felony
to include “any illicit trafficking in any controlled substance” and
any crime of violence or money laundering for which the term of
imprisonment imposed exceeded five years.38 In 1994, Congress passed
the Immigration and Nationality Technical Corrections Act (INTCA),
expanding the definition of aggravated felony to include theft, docu-
ment fraud, racketeering, kidnapping, smuggling, prostitution-related
offenses, child pornography, national-security-related violations, and
conspiracy to commit any such crimes.39 Prior to the restrictive 1996
legislation referenced above, noncitizens convicted of an aggravated
felony would be placed in deportation proceedings with prescribed
avenues for discretionary relief in cases where equities such as
family ties in the United States mitigated against their deportation.40
The serious nature of many of the crimes deemed “aggravated
felonies” suggests that it is indeed reasonable for federal authorities
to consider whether such conduct requires revocation of a non-
citizen’s permission to remain in the United States.41 Notably, it is
inappropriate to view deportation as punishment for the underlying
crime, inasmuch as this is the role of the criminal justice system,
which has determined and applied a punishment for the crime by
the time the removal proceeding is initiated.42 Because deportation
34. Id.
35. Id. at 14, 18–19.
36. Melissa Cook, Banished for Minor Crimes: The Aggravated Felony Provision of
the Immigration and Nationality Act as a Human Rights Violation, 23 B.C. THIRD WORLD
L.J. 293, 299 (2003).
37. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 7342, 102 Stat. 4181, 4469
(1988) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)).
38. Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, § 501, 104 Stat. 4978, 5048 (1990)
(codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)).
39. Immigration and Nationality Technical Corrections Act (INTCA), Pub. L. No. 103-
416, § 220, 108 Stat. 4305, 4305 (1994) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)).
40. Cook, supra note 36, at 301–03.
41. HUM. RTS. WATCH, supra note 33, at 14, 18–19.
42. See Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 709 (1893) (noting that
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in such circumstances is not considered punishment, constitutional
protections in the criminal justice context, such as prohibitions against
double jeopardy or cruel and unusual punishment, are inapplica-
ble.43 In light of the fact that noncitizens convicted of crimes qualify-
ing as “aggravated felonies” will have been subject to the full force
of the criminal justice system, and recognizing the value of family
unity in immigration law and policy more broadly,44 it is perhaps no
surprise that immigration law included discretionary relief from
removal in such cases.
Prior to the 1996 Acts, there existed a variety of means for a
noncitizen in deportation or exclusion proceedings to plead equities
before a judge in hopes of keeping his or her family together, not-
withstanding a criminal conviction.45 These included: (1) a judicial
recommendation against deportation, whereby a criminal judge could
make a binding recommendation not to deport a person convicted of
a crime; (2) suspension of deportation, which permitted a non-LPR
who had resided in the United States for seven years to suspend
deportation that would cause extreme hardship; (3) waiver of depor-
tation under 212(h), which provided a noncitizen spouse, child, or
parent of a U.S. citizen or LPR, the opportunity to ask an immigra-
tion judge to waive deportation for certain crimes upon a showing
of extreme hardship; and (4) waiver of deportation under 212(c),
which provided an LPR who had been lawfully present in the United
States for seven years to plead equities, such as family ties, to secure
a waiver of deportation from an immigration judge.46 Although the
1990 Act eliminated judicial recommendations against deportation,
the other forms of relief remained available—even to persons con-
victed of aggravated felonies, until 1996.47
First, the 1996 laws drastically expanded the number of crimes
considered aggravated felonies.48 AEDPA expanded the aggravated
felony provision of the INA to include commercial bribery, forgery,
counterfeiting, trafficking in illegal vehicles, obstruction of justice,
perjury, bribing a witness, failing to appear before court on a felony
charge, and forging or altering passports.49 IIRAIRA added rape and
deportation is not punishment). But see Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 374 (2010)
(finding a 6th Amendment right to be advised of immigration consequences of deportation
because deportation has punitive aspects).
43. See, e.g., Hinds v. Lynch, 790 F.3d 259, 264, 266 (1st Cir. 2015).
44. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
45. See HUM. RTS. WATCH, supra note 33, at 13.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 25.
48. Dawn Marie Johnson, The AEDPA and the IIRIRA: Treating Misdemeanors as
Felonies for Immigration Purposes, 27 J. LEGIS. 477, 481–82 (2001).
49. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-
32, § 440(e), 110 Stat. 1214 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)).
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sexual abuse of a minor to the aggravated felony provision of the
INA,50 and reduced the sentencing requirements and monetary
amounts attached to the least serious classes of crimes, such that
far more criminal activity was captured by these provisions.51 For
example, where a theft crime qualified as an aggravated felony only
if it drew a sentence of five years or more before 1996, IIRAIRA
reduced the qualifying sentence to one year or more.52 Similarly,
IIRAIRA lowered the threshold for the crime of tax evasion from
$200,000 to $10,000 in order to qualify as an aggravated felony.53
Second, this drastic expansion of categories and classes of crimes
that qualify as aggravated felonies was accompanied by an elimina-
tion of discretionary relief from deportation.54 Initially, AEDPA made
212(c) relief unavailable to lawful permanent residents charged as
removable for an aggravated felony.55 IIRAIRA then eliminated the
212(c) waiver all together as well as suspension of deportation and
made the 212(h) waiver unavailable to persons convicted of an ag-
gravated felony.56 IIRAIRA created a new defense against removal,
called cancellation of removal, as a replacement.57 Cancellation of
removal, however, was made unavailable to noncitizens convicted
of an aggravated felony.58
Ultimately, the 1996 laws had the effect of eliminating any
opportunity for immigration adjudicators to halt deportations to
maintain family unity in cases where noncitizens had been con-
victed of a drastically expanded list of aggravated felonies.59 This
created a mandatory removal regime that has plagued the immi-
grant community in the United States ever since.60
50. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRAIRA) of 1996,
Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 321(a), 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-627 (codified as amended at 8
U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)).
51. § 321(a)(2), (7), 110 Stat. at 3009-627–28.
52. § 321(a)(3), 110 Stat. at 3009-627.
53. § 321(a)(7), 110 Stat. at 3009-627.
54. Paul B. Hunker, Cancellation of Removal or Cancellation of Relief?—The 1996
IIRIRA Amendments: A Review and Critique of Section 240A(A) of the Immigration and
Nationality Act, 15 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 1, 30 (2000).
55. See id. at 3.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 2.
58. Id. at 3.
59. See Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA), Pub.
L. No. 104-208, § 304(a), 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-594 (1996) (codified as amended at 8
U.S.C. § 1229b) (eliminating the availability of cancellation of removal to all noncitizens
who committed an aggravated felony and leaving no room for judicial discretion)); see also
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), Pub. L. No. 104-32,
§ 440(e), 1214, 1277–78 (1996) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. §1101(a)(43) (providing
a new expansive list of additional felonies to be considered aggravated felonies)).
60. See HUM. RTS. WATCH, supra note 33, at 5–6.
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Ten years after the 1996 laws, Human Rights Watch found that
approximately 670 thousand people had been removed for criminal
offenses and estimated that 1.6 million spouses and children had
been separated from family members as a result.61 Although the data
did not provide information on how many removals involved LPRs
as opposed non-LPRs,62 the sheer magnitude of that figure leaves
little doubt that a substantial number of people were separated from
their family members without access to discretionary relief based on
their family relationships.63 Moreover, even a single removal with-
out access to discretionary relief based on family ties is an abuse,
though that point is made most effectively with anecdotal accounts.
The Human Rights Watch report featured many individuals such
as Kannareth, who immigrated to the United States from a Thai ref-
ugee camp when he was only ten years old.64 Kannareth got into
trouble when he was fifteen for driving without a license and then
violating his probation by pickpocketing.65 He then got back on track,
went to college to learn a trade, began a promising career, and had a
daughter with a woman he planned to marry.66 He went to renew his
green card after the enactment of the 1996 laws, and a criminal back-
ground check brought up his youthful indiscretions.67 He was ulti-
mately removed without any recourse to discretionary relief to keep
him unified with his U.S. citizen daughter, fiancé, and aging mother.68
Such anecdotes illustrate the disproportionate nature of re-
moval away from family members for past crimes. Moreover, a sub-
stantial body of social sciences research has followed the Human
Rights Watch report to demonstrate the deeply damaging effects
that such harsh deportation laws have had on families in the United
States and transnationally.69 This literature explores many ways in
which families suffer as a result of deportation laws, including
leaving spouses without necessary emotional and financial support,
which can result in food insecurity and homelessness.70 Studies of
61. Id. at 5–6.
62. Id. at 6.
63. See id.
64. Id. at 51.
65. Id.
66. HUM. RTS. WATCH, supra note 33, at 51.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 51–52.
69. See infra notes 70–73 and accompanying text.
70. See BLANCA RAMIREZ, LATINO PUB. POL’Y, INTERRUPTED FAMILY TIES: HOW THE
DETENTION OR DEPORTATION OF A PARENT TRANSFORMS FAMILY LIFE 4–5 (2018), https://
bettercarenetwork.org/sites/default/files/Interrupted%20Family%20Ties_%20How%20
the%20Detention%20or%20Deportation%20of%20a%20Pa.pdf [https://perma.cc/5PP7-KS
N6]; see also Regina Day Langhout, Sara L. Buckingham, Ashmeet Kaur Oberoi, Noé
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this nature consistently feature the particularly acute suffering
experienced by U.S. citizen children who are separated from parents
for extended periods, often permanently, and at times thrust into
the foster care system as a result.71 These children suffer severe
psychological, emotional, and economic repercussions that hamper
their health and well-being and alter the trajectories of their lives.72
Excluding these considerations from individual removal decisions
is inhumane and misguided as a matter of public policy.73
B. Cancellation of Removal and Its Limits
IIRAIRA created a framework for discretionary relief from re-
moval called cancellation of removal.74 There are two sections, which
set forth a framework for relief for LPRs placed in removal proceed-
ings as well as non-LPRs, which provides an avenue for undocu-
mented immigrants to seek discretionary relief from removal.75 Each
section calls for a two-step process, including an inquiry into an
applicant’s statutory eligibility, followed by consideration of relevant
evidence in support of an eligible applicant’s request for discretionary
relief from removal.76 The principal problems with cancellation of
Rubén Chavez, Dana Rusch, Francesca Esposito & Yolanda Suarez-Balcazar, Statement
on the Effects of Deportation and Forced Separation on Immigrants, their Families, and
Communities, 62 AM.J.CMTY.PSYCH. 3, 4 (2018), https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf
/10.1002/ajcp.12256; AJAYCHAUDRY,RANDYCAPPS,JUAN-MANUELPEDROZA,ROSAMARIA
CASTAÑEDA, ROBERT SANTOS & MOLLY M. SCOTT, URB. INST. FACING OUR FUTURE: CHIL-
DREN IN THE AFTERMATH OF IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT, 1 (2010), https://www.urban
.org/sites/default/files/publication/28331/412020-Facing-Our-Future.PDF [https://perma
.cc/H4W2-KQUU].
71. See RANDY CAPPS, HEATHER KOBALL, ANDREA CAMPETELLA, KRISTA PERREIRA,
SARAH HOOKER &JUAN MANUEL PEDROZA, IMPLICATIONS OF IMMIGRATIONENFORCEMENT
ACTIVITIES FOR THE WELL-BEING OF CHILDREN IN IMMIGRANT FAMILIES: A REVIEW OF THE
LITERATURE 5 (2015), https://www.migrationpolicy.org/research/implications-immigra
tion-enforcement-activities-well-being-children-immigrant-families [https://perma.cc/F2
DX-ZJWM]; see also Luis H. Zayas & Mollie H. Bradlee, Exiling Children, Creating
Orphans: When Immigration Policies Hurt Citizens, 59 SOC. WORK 167, 167 (2014).
72. See Gaiane Nazarian, Separation Due to Deportation: Psychological, Emotional,
and Economic Affect on Children of Deported Parents 39–42 (M.S.W. Project, California
State University) (2014) (CSUSB ScholarWorks); AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL, U.S. CITIZEN
CHILDREN IMPACTED BY IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT 1–2 (2019), https://www.ameri
canimmigrationcouncil.org/sites/default/files/research/us_citizen_children_impacted_by
_immigration_enforcement.pdf [https://perma.cc/3HRN-XN7L].
73. JOANNA DREBY, HOW TODAY’S IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT POLICIES IMPACT
CHILDREN,FAMILIES, AND COMMUNITIES 30–31 (2012), https://www.americanprogress.org
/issues/immigration/reports/2012/08/20/27082/how-todays-immigration-enforcement-poli
cies-impact-children-families-and-communities [https://perma.cc/S2ZP-R3YV].
74. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229b.
75. Compare 8 U.S.C. §§ 1229b(a)–(b) (LPR cancellation), with 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)
(non-LPR cancellation).
76. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(4).
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removal arise from the broad provisions that make certain applicants
ineligible, which in turn severely limit the number of cases in which
immigration authorities may exercise discretion to cancel removal.77
In order to qualify for LPR cancellation of removal, a noncitizen
must demonstrate seven years of lawful residence in the United
States, five of which must be in LPR status.78 These two status re-
quirements are temporal in nature, and they represent the threshold
for consideration of family ties and other equitable factors that may
lead an immigration judge to cancel removal.79 These limits are
problematic inasmuch as they set an arbitrary limit that prevents
an immigration judge from exercising discretion favorably if a non-
citizen falls just a few days short, notwithstanding robust family
ties to U.S. citizen children, spouses, and parents.80 The require-
ment to reside continuously in the United States after being admitted
in any status is further complicated by the “stop-time” rule, which
stops the accrual of presence upon the issuance of a Notice to Ap-
pear in immigration court, or upon the commission of certain crimes.81
The provision that stops the accrual of lawful presence upon the
commission of certain crimes was specifically addressed by the U.S.
Supreme Court in its 2020 decision in Barton v. Barr.82 This Article
will examine the U.S. Supreme Court’s error in Barton in greater
detail below, but it is sufficient at this point to highlight that the
commission of certain crimes within an LPR’s first seven years in
the United States will make them ineligible for cancellation of re-
moval.83 Notably, the Supreme Court determined in Barton that the
crimes that limit relief can be relatively minor offenses that would
not otherwise serve as the basis for the removal of an LPR, but may
block access to this form of relief if the noncitizen is later charged as
removable for other conduct.84 Once again, an LPR’s ineligibility
from this relief means that an immigration judge does not have the
discretion to balance potentially expansive family ties against the
public safety imperative of removal; rather, removal in such cases
is a foregone conclusion.85
77. See Hunker, supra note 54, at 2–3.
78. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1229b(a)(1)–(2).
79. See In re Blancas-Lara, 23 I&N Dec. 458, 459–61 (B.I.A. 2002) (stating non-
immigration status counts towards seven years, otherwise it would be superfluous to the
five years LPR).
80. See Cook, supra note 36, at 309.
81. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(d)(1).
82. See Barton v. Barr, 140 S. Ct. 1442, 1447–48 (2020).
83. Id. at 1446.
84. See id. at 1451–52.
85. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1229b(a)(1)–(2); Cook, supra note 36, at 298.
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This substantial limitation on relief is compounded by another
provision that deems ineligible any noncitizen who has been con-
victed of an aggravated felony.86 The expansive nature of the aggra-
vated felony provision was covered in detail in the prior section and
includes offenses that are neither aggravated nor felonious.87 Can-
cellation of removal for LPRs therefore is limited largely by the com-
mission or conviction of crimes, with the most severe limitations for
aggravated felonies but substantial limitations also connected to a
wider variety of crimes that trigger grounds of inadmissibility and
deportability.88 In this way, the mandatory removal regime for LPRs
in the United States is quite broad.89
Cancellation of removal for non-LPRs, often utilized by undocu-
mented immigrants as a defense against removal, is substantially
more limited.90 First, a non-LPR must make the threshold showings
that she has been continuously physically present in the United States
for ten years and has not committed a broad category of crimes.91
Notably, the stop-time rule referenced above also applies to non-
LPR cancellation of removal, and the same categories of crimes stop
the accrual of physical presence.92 Assuming the applicant for relief
from removal passes these eligibility thresholds, an immigration
judge will determine whether she has made sufficient showings of
good moral character and that her removal would cause “exceptional
and extremely unusual hardship” to a U.S. citizen or LPR spouse,
child, or parent.93
The hardship standard for non-LPRs is notoriously burdensome
and very few otherwise eligible applicants can make the necessary
showing.94 The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) has established
that “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” means “hardship
that is substantially beyond that which would ordinarily be expected
to result from the [person’s departure].”95 In applying this heightened
standard, the BIA has denied relief to the mother of two U.S. citizen
86. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1229b(a)(3), (b)(1)(C).
87. See supra notes 48–53 and accompanying text.
88. See Barton, 140 S. Ct. at 1448–50.
89. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1229b(a)(1)–(2) (to be eligible for cancellation of removal, an LPR
must not have been convicted of any aggravated felony); see also Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-32, § 440(e), 110 Stat. 1214, 1277
(codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)).
90. Compare 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1), with 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a).
91. 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(A), (C) (excluding noncitizens who have been convicted of
a crime listed in INA sections 1182(a)(2), 1227(a)(2), or 1227(a)(3)).
92. 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(d)(1).
93. 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(B), (D).
94. Hunker, supra note 54, at 44–46.
95. In re Monreal-Aquinaga, 23 I&N Dec. 56, 56 (B.I.A. 2001).
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children because the children’s father was in the United States with
authorization and could care for them.96 Tragically, the trauma that
children suffer when their parents are torn away from them has
become ordinary and expected in the U.S. system of removal.97
Although this form of relief is often considered to be available
only to families in an extremely precarious situation, such as chil-
dren with medical conditions who rely on the parent in removal pro-
ceedings, the BIA has insisted that the burden is not exceptional.98
Indeed, in the case of an undocumented single mother of four U.S.
citizen children whose entire family was in the United States in a
range of immigration statuses, the BIA found that her return alone
to Mexico without her family would indeed produce “exceptional and
extremely unusual hardship.”99 Though there is clearly a way to
overcome this exceedingly high hardship standard, having family in
the country of nationality, some resources to make a transition, or
the ability to leave the children with family in the United States, all
routinely lead to the denial of this form of relief.100
Along with a variety of other limitations,101 the temporal re-
quirements, crime-based exclusions for both LPR and non-LPR
cancellation of removal, and in the case of non-LPR cancellation, the
impossibly high hardship standard make this relief very limited in
scope. An administrative system that routinely separates families,
even when they have compelling claims to stay united, appears to
violate fundamental principles of due process.102 However, a direct
challenge to the inhumanity of this system of removal appears to be
precluded by a century-old doctrine that places the authority of Con-
gress to set the rules for immigration virtually beyond reproach.103
The next section examines the difficulties inherent in a judicial chal-
lenge to Congressionally established rules for removal that fail to
consider compelling family ties in the United States.
C. The Plenary Power Doctrine and Family Life
A civil administrative regime that further punishes a certain
category of people, in this case noncitizens, for criminal activity and
96. See In re Andazola-Rivas, 23 I&N Dec. 319, 324 (B.I.A. 2002).
97. See CAPPS ET AL., supra note 71.
98. See In re Recinas, 23 I&N Dec. 467, 470 (B.I.A. 2002).
99. Id. at 473.
100. See Hunker, supra note 54, at 44–46; supra notes 95–96 and accompanying text.
101. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(c).
102. See, e.g., In re Monreal-Aquinaga, 23 I&N Dec. 56, 56 (B.I.A. 2001); see also 8
U.S.C. §§ 1229b(a)(1)–(2).
103. See infra Section I.C.
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results in the protracted or permanent separation of nuclear fami-
lies would seem ripe for a direct constitutional due process chal-
lenge.104 However, the authority of the U.S. Congress to define the
terms of admission and removal from the national territory has long
been insulated from constitutional challenge by the plenary power
doctrine, which ensures limited review by federal courts.105 The foun-
dational cases commonly accepted to have established the plenary
power doctrine emerged from an era of racist immigration regula-
tion that called for the exclusion and expulsion of Chinese nationals
from the United States.106 In Chae Chan Ping, the Supreme Court
found that the power to regulate immigration was inherent to sover-
eignty and upheld the authority of Congress to exclude all Chinese
nationals from entry.107 The Supreme Court then extended this
doctrine to the expulsion context in Fong Yue Ting, upholding the
constitutionality of a requirement that Chinese nationals provide
“one . . . white witness” to support their claim to U.S. residency.108
The Court held that “[t]he right to exclude or to expel all aliens, or
any class of aliens, absolutely or upon certain conditions, in war or
in peace, [is] an inherent and inalienable right of every sovereign
and independent nation.”109 This doctrine continues to have salience
in modern times.110
Scholars have theorized an end to the plenary power doctrine
and identified numerous cases in which the Supreme Court has
conducted a review of immigration laws under some semblance of
104. See, e.g., In re Monreal-Aquinaga, 23 I&N Dec. at 57–58.
105. See Legomsky, Principle of Plenary Congressional Power, supra note 6, at 306; see
also Motomura, supra note 6, at611;Legomsky, Ten More Years of Plenary Power, supra
note 6, at 926; Michael Scaperlanda, Polishing the Tarnished Golden Door, 15 IMMIGR.
& NAT’LITY L. REV. 21, 23 (1993); Kerry Abrams, Family Reunification and the Security
State, 32 CONST. COMMENT. 247, 258 (2017).
106. Motomura, supra note 6, at 550–54.
107. Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 603 (1889); see also Nishimura Ekiu
v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 659–60 (1892) (holding that “[i]t is an accepted maxim
of international law that every sovereign nation has the power, as inherent in sover-
eignty, and essential to self-preservation, to forbid the entrance of foreigners within its
dominions, or to admit them only in such cases and upon such conditions as it may see
fit to prescribe”).
108. Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 729 (1893).
109. Id. at 711.
110. See, e.g., Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Thuraissigiam, 140 S. Ct. 1959, 1963–64 (2020)
(upholding precedent set in Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 660 (1892));
see also Marty Lederman, Contrary to Popular Belief, The Court Did Not Hold that the
Travel Ban is Lawful—Anything But, JUST SECURITY (July 2, 2018), https://www.just
security.org/58807/contrary-popular-belief-court-hold-travel-ban-lawful-anything-but
-which-ruling-justice-kennedys-deference-presidents-enforcement-ban-indefensible [https://
perma.cc/6JAT-4HHP] (observing that “[a] 5–4 majority of the Justices held, in effect, that
even if the Proclamation is unconstitutional there’s nothing the Court can do about it”).
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constitutional due process analysis, notwithstanding plenary power.111
For example, in his seminal 1984 article, Stephen Legomsky pre-
dicted that an emerging trend among federal courts to perform a
rational basis review of problematic immigration statutes would
compel the Supreme Court “to lay the general principle to rest.”112
Ten years later, recognizing that the Supreme Court had not taken
this much-needed step, Legomsky identified three ways in which
lower courts could “forge creative detours” around the plenary power
doctrine.113 Legomsky wrote that lower courts could utilize a “mild
rational basis” review in considering whether deportation cases met
standards for equal protection and substantive due process,114
expanding exceptions for procedural due process,115 or carving out
new exceptions.116
Hiroshi Motomura resonated with Legomsky, arguing that the
insulation of immigration laws against direct constitutional chal-
lenges under the plenary power doctrine led to the emergence of
“phantom constitutional norms” to challenge the political branches’
immigration authority.117 Motomura, however, expressed skepticism
about this phantom constitutional decision-making because it creates
two conflicting sets of norms—one for normal constitutional cases
and one for immigration cases.118 Motomura observed that these
parallel sets of norms have created a situation in which “[g]overnment
briefs in immigration cases rely heavily on directly applicable con-
stitutional immigration law, while advocates for [noncitizens] cite
the subconstitutional phantom norm decisions.”119 Motomura opined
that this was problematic because it leads to a situation in which the
government and advocates talk past one another, and he suggested
that genuine dialogue will be restored “only when courts . . . take
111. See, e.g., infra notes 112–21 and accompanying text.
112. Legomsky, Principle of Plenary Congressional Power, supra note 6, at 305.
113. Legomsky, Ten More Years of Plenary Power, supra note 6, at 928–29.
114. See id. at 931.
115. See id. at 931–32 (noting that noncitizens may challenge the conditions of their
confinement on due process grounds due to “gross physical abuse” on US soil or “either
irrational or excessive detention can amount to punishment even without an intent to
punish, and that such punishment cannot be imposed without due process”).
116. Id. at 933–34 (discussing using innovative ways to find First Amendment pro-
tection in deportation cases); see Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm. v. Meese, 714 F.
Supp. 1060, 1075 (C.D. Cal. 1989), rev’d on other grounds, 970 F.2d 501 (1991) (reasoning
that because the Supreme Court in Harisiades case had dismissed First Amendment
challenges of deported aliens without mentioning the plenary power doctrine, it meant
that the traditional First Amendment standards apply to deportation cases); see also
Rafeedie v. Immigr. & Naturalization Service, 795 F. Supp. 13, 21–23 (D.D.C. 1992) (apply-
ing customary First Amendment standards to noncitizens challenging their exclusion).
117. Motomura, supra note 6, at 610–11.
118. Id. at 549.
119. Id. at 612.
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the next step and begin to put their constitutional thinking in ex-
pressly constitutional terms.”120 In the meantime, however, Motomura
suggested that this “indirect expression of an alternative body of
constitutional immigration law” has resulted in a weakening of ple-
nary power and he forecasted the eventual demise of the doctrine.121
In Trump v. Hawaii, Motomura joined a group of family, immi-
gration, and constitutional law scholars in an amicus brief to urge
the Supreme Court to recognize a constitutional right to family life
and find that President Trump’s travel ban arbitrarily interfered
with that right.122 Kerry Abrams, who was integral to that amicus
effort, subsequently wrote an article advancing the central argu-
ment of the amicus brief that modern “courts will recognize family
reunification as an interest of constitutional import, and will bal-
ance that interest against the genuine national security interests of
the government.”123 In developing this argument, Abrams consid-
ered the vitality of the plenary power doctrine during three distinct
time periods that she describes in terms of developments in family and
constitutional law.124 These time periods are “the age of the unitary
family,”125 “the age of security,”126 and “the age of balancing.”127
“[T]he age of the unitary family” coincided with the founda-
tional period of the plenary power doctrine.128 Abrams notes that the
original text of the U.S. Constitution does not mention family, just
as it does not enumerate a federal immigration power.129 Abrams
argues that the societal norms over both family and immigration
that were present when the Constitution was drafted are no longer
present today.130 At the same time, rights that were unfathomable
at the time that the Constitution was drafted have solidified in
modern times.131 Indeed, “[b]efore the advent of international hu-
man rights and the constitutionalization of individual rights, natu-
ral rights were part of the fabric of society and informed how courts
and legislatures understood the scope of their power, but were not
120. Id. at 613.
121. Id. at 610–11.
122. See Brief for Immigration, Family and Constitutional Law Professors as Amici
Curiae Supporting Respondents at 20–25, Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018) (No.
17-965).
123. Abrams, supra note 105, at 248–49.
124. See id. at 248.
125. Id. at 250.
126. Id. at 258.
127. Id. at 265.
128. Id. at 250, 254–55.
129. Abrams, supra note 105, at 250.
130. Id. at 251.
131. See id. at 249–51, 269.
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cognizable rights on their own.”132 Accordingly, in the age of the
unitary family, there was very little tension between principles of
family unity and the state’s plenary immigration power.133 Abrams
views the Chinese Exclusion Case and its progeny through this lens,
recognizing that the establishment of a broad rule of unreviewable
immigration authority had a direct impact on individual rights, in
particular the right to family life.134
Abrams then described “the age of security” as marked by both
the continued development and strengthening of the plenary power
doctrine in the constitutional jurisprudence and the evolution of
constitutional conceptions of family life.135 On the one hand, the
Supreme Court invoked plenary power to uphold exclusion and long-
term immigration detention based on notions of national security in
Knauff v. Shaughnessy and Shaughnessy v. Mezei, notwithstanding
the effects of these decisions on family life.136 On the other hand, the
conception of the family was evolving in society and in the eyes of the
Supreme Court.137 Even though marriage would not be constitution-
ally protected until 1967, with the Court’s seminal decision striking
down an anti-miscegenation law in Loving v. Virginia,138 the Su-
preme Court was already thinking about protections for family life.139
Justice Jackson’s dissent in Knauff demonstrates perfectly the tension
that was beginning to develop in the constitutional jurisprudence,
where he stated: “Congress will have to use more explicit language
than any yet cited before I will agree that it has authorized an ad-
ministrative officer to break up the family of an American citizen or
force him to keep his wife by becoming an exile.”140 This was a pre-
cursor to the “age of balancing.”141
Abrams referred to the modern era as “the age of balancing”
because courts are recognizing family ties as constitutional liberty
interests and balancing them with national security interests.142
According to Abrams, “[t]his recognition is beginning to lead to a
more nuanced analysis in specific cases, with an understanding that
132. Id. at 258.
133. Id. at 252.
134. Id. at 258.
135. Abrams, supra note 105, at 258, 264–65.
136. Id. at 260–62 (citing United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537
(1950) & Shaughnessy v. ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206 (1953)).
137. Id. at 262.
138. See id. (citing Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967)).
139. Id. at 260.
140. United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 551–52 (1950)
(Jackson, J., dissenting).
141. Abrams, supra note 105, at 264–65.
142. Id. at 265.
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even a right as important as family unity can be overridden by
security concerns, but that the bald claim of ‘national security’ without
more does not automatically override family interests.”143 Abrams
highlighted important constitutional jurisprudence from Loving v.
Virginia to Obergefell v. Hodges—which extended the fundamental
right to marry to same-sex couples—as evidence of an evolving con-
stitutional right to family life.144 Abrams argued that constitu-
tionalized family law protects the rights of family members vis-à-vis
the rights of other family members, and that such rights “are ripe
for balancing against other interests,” such as the state’s immigra-
tion power.145
Abrams’ argument, however compelling, was largely ignored by
the Supreme Court in Trump v. Hawaii, where it upheld the Presi-
dent’s ban on immigration from several Muslim majority countries
notwithstanding the impact on family reunification.146 Regardless,
while the Supreme Court did not adopt the rationale advanced by
Abrams, Motomura, and other prominent scholars, in the context of
immigrant admissions does not limit the extension of that rationale to
the removal context.147 Indeed, Abrams’ conception of a constitution-
alized family law that requires balancing the right to family life
against the state’s immigration authority is even more persuasive
in the cases of settled migrants with deep family ties in the United
States.148 Moreover, Abrams’ argument that such balancing is re-
quired resonates with international human rights doctrine, and
therefore connects to yet another theory of modern limitations on
plenary power.149
Michael Scaperlanda has argued that the emergence of the in-
ternational human rights regime has tempered the absolutist con-
ception of sovereignty that prevailed when plenary power emerged in
constitutional jurisprudence, and that doctrine does not withstand
scrutiny under a modern conception of sovereignty.150 Scaperlanda
offers a historical account of the development of the concept of
sovereignty that maps on to Abrams’ account of the constitution-
alization of family law.151 Taken together, these two accounts de-
scribe parallel processes by which family rights have become more
143. Id.
144. Id. at 260, 268–69.
145. Id. at 269.
146. See Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2445 (2018) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
147. Id.
148. Abrams, supra note 105, at 265–66.
149. Id.
150. See Scaperlanda, supra note 105, at 88.
151. See id.; see also Abrams, supra note 105, at 266–68.
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embedded while state sovereignty has weakened as a rationale for
plenary power.152
Scaperlanda begins his analysis with the foundational cases
that established the plenary power doctrine addressed above.153
Scaperlanda argues that “[p]lenary power developed in this era of
‘absolute’ sovereignty, when no global legal infrastructure existed
to harness the power of an individual nation-state within its own
domain.”154 As an example of the prominence of absolutism in the
Supreme Court at the end of the 19th century, Scaperlanda high-
lights the Court’s own words in Chae Chan Ping, that national
sovereignty is “necessarily exclusive and absolute . . . susceptible of
no limitation not imposed by itself.”155 This understanding of sover-
eignty also pervaded the Court’s decision in Fong Yue Ting, in which
the Court emphasized that “[t]he right of a nation to expel or deport
foreigners, who have not been naturalized or taken any steps to-
ward becoming citizens of the country, rests upon the same grounds,
and is as absolute and unqualified as the right to prohibit and
prevent their entrance into the country.”156
Scaperlanda goes on to observe that the age of absolutism is
over and that modern international law places limits on sovereign
authority, most notably in the area of human rights protection.157
Indeed, in the wake of World War II and the horrors perpetrated by
the Nazis in the name of national sovereignty, international human
rights law developed into “a new international regime that would
embed within its legal firmament concerns for the individual vis a
vis the state.”158 In Scaperlanda’s view, the emergence of human rights
law was accompanied by the recession of absolute sovereignty.159 He
argues that “[t]he presence of binding human rights standards in
the international legal order means, fundamentally, that nation-
states have agreed to relinquish some measure of sovereignty over
individuals within their borders.”160 Moreover, he highlights that
customary international law imposes limits on state sovereignty,
and where human rights principles imbue that body of binding
international law, sovereign states are compelled to comply.161
152. Abrams, supra note 105, at 265, 268–69; Scaperlanda, supra note 105, at 71.
153. See Scaperlanda, supra note 105, at 23.
154. Id. at 26.
155. Id. (citing Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 604 (1889)).
156. Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 707 (1893).
157. See Scaperlanda, supra note 105, at 71.
158. Id. at 58.
159. Id. at 70–71.
160. Id. at 27.
161. Id. at 66.
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Scaperlanda concludes that the plenary power doctrine was
founded on an outdated absolutist conception of sovereignty and
should be re-evaluated in light of the international human rights
regime.162 Scaperlanda’s theory for an end to the plenary power
doctrine dovetails nicely with Abrams’ own theory that constitution-
alized family law will require courts to balance family life against
the government interests in immigration regulation.163 Indeed, the
prohibition against arbitrary interference with family life is one of
the most important international human rights protections for non-
citizens facing expulsion.164 The following section presents the robust
body of treaty law and international jurisprudence that establishes
the human right to family life in the immigration context.
II. THE INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHT TO FAMILY LIFE
International law regarding the family is relatively new, and
prior to the advent of human rights law after World War II, such rules
mostly concerned the choice of law in cases before national courts
involving immigrants or persons of mixed nationality.165 The 1948
Universal Declaration on Human Rights (UDHR) provided the first
substantive law on the protection of the family.166 The UDHR estab-
lished both the right to create a family and the imperative to protect
the family as the “natural and fundamental group unit of society.”167
Moreover, it established a specific framework for the protection of
this right when it provided that: “[n]o one shall be subjected to
arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, home or correspon-
dence” and “[e]veryone has the right to the protection of the law
against such interference or attacks.”168 While it is true that some
time passed before these rights were cemented in treaties, and then
applied explicitly in the immigration context, it is now clear that the
right to family life provides both a narrow basis for immigration into
a country for purposes of family reunification, as well as a robust
defense against expulsion.169 The human right to family life, therefore,
162. Id. at 84.
163. See Scaperlanda, supra note 105, at 84; see also Abrams, supra note 105, at 265–66.
164. See discussion infra Part II.
165. Sonja Starr & Lea Brilmayer, Family Separation as a Violation of International
Law, 21 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 213, 216 (2003).
166. See G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 16
(Dec. 10, 1948).
167. Id.
168. Id. at art. 12.
169. See Vincent Chetail, The Transnational Movement of Persons under General
International Law-Mapping the Customary Law Foundations of International Migration
Law, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON INT’L L. & MIGRATION 1, 41–42 (Vincent Chetail &
Celine Bauloz eds., 2014).
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limits sovereign authority with regard to the regulation of entry and
residence of migrants in certain circumstances.170
This section will first argue that the United States routinely
violates the human right to family life through its mandatory de-
portation regime by analyzing an Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights (Inter-American Commission) case. In Wayne Smith,
Hugo Armendariz, et al. v. the United States, the Inter-American Com-
mission considered cases of mandatory deportation through the lens
of the United States’ regional human rights obligations and found vio-
lations of a systematic nature.171 This section goes on to present family
life jurisprudence from the UN Human Rights Committee (HRC) and
the European Court of Human Rights (European Court), demonstrat-
ing that major international human rights bodies have cemented a
rule that requires consideration of family life in expulsion cases.
Importantly, this body of jurisprudence does not establish an unquali-
fied right to family life for noncitizens.172 Indeed, international law
empowers states to create rules to regulate the movement of non-
citizens into their national territory and may decline to reunify family
members across borders or expel noncitizens notwithstanding family
ties.173 However, states are required to balance the human right to
family life as part of individualized expulsion decisions, and states
violate their human rights obligations when they either fail to consider
family life or err in properly balancing that right.174
A. The U.S. Deportation Regime Violates the Right to Family Life
The American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man
(American Declaration) of 1948 mirrors in many important ways the
UDHR, finalized later that same year.175 Specifically with regard to
family life, the American Declaration includes the right to establish a
family in Article VI and protection against abusive attacks on family
life in Article V.176 In 2010, the Inter-American Commission decided
Wayne Smith and concluded that the U.S. mandatory deportation
170. Id. at 32.
171. See Smith v. United States, Inter-Am. Comm’n. H.R., Report No. 81/10-Case
12.562, ¶¶ 55–60 (2010).
172. See Helen Lambert, Family Unity in Migration Law: The Evolution of a More
Unified Approach in Europe, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON INT’L L. AND MIGRATION 194,
196 (Vincent Chetial & Celine Bauloz eds., 2014).
173. Id.
174. See id. at 199–200.
175. Compare Organization of American States, American Declaration of the Rights
and Duties of Man, O.A.S. G.A. Res. XXX, O.A.S. Doc. OEA/Ser.L.V/II.82 (1948), with
G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Dec. 10, 1948).
176. American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, supra note 175, at arts.
V–VI.
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regime violates these rights as well as related substantive and pro-
cedural protections.177 This case focused on two noncitizens who
became mandatorily deportable after the 1996 amendments to the
INA eliminated 212(c) relief for LPRs who had been convicted of an
aggravated felony.178 The Commission’s decision in Wayne Smith is
significant because it clearly establishes that the U.S. practice of
removing noncitizens for criminal convictions without any consider-
ation of their family ties violates its human rights obligations.179
Wayne Smith had been an LPR in the United States for twenty-
five years when he was deported.180 In 1967, when he was ten years
old, Mr. Smith arrived in the United States from Trinidad as a de-
pendent of a diplomatic visa holder.181 While his parents separated
in the United States, he lived with his mother and became an LPR
in 1974.182 Unfortunately, Mr. Smith “fell in with the wrong crowd
and began using drugs.”183 In February 1990, he was convicted of
possession and attempted distribution of cocaine.184 After pleading
guilty, Mr. Smith spent three years in prison.185
While serving his time at the Lorton Reformatory, Mr. Smith
attended Narcotics Anonymous, participated in classes at the Uni-
versity of the District of Columbia, and coordinated the Christian
services at the prison’s chapel.186 Mr. Smith ultimately was paroled
for his behavior and rehabilitation.187
After his release from prison, Mr. Smith remained an active
volunteer with the prison ministry while continuing his studies at
the University of the District of Columbia with a scholarship from
Action to Rehabilitate Community Housing.188 He acted as a drug
counselor and volunteered with other organizations like the Com-
munity for Creative Non-Violence, a charity that provides services
for the homeless.189 He never failed his bimonthly drug screening
177. Wayne Smith, Hugo Armendariz, et al. v. United States, Case 12.562, Inter-Am.
Comm’n H.R., Report No. 81/10, ¶ 60 (2010).
178. Id. ¶¶ 12–21.
179. Id. ¶ 38.
180. Brief for Petitioners at 3, Wayne Smith, Hugo Armendariz, et al. v. United States,
Case 12.561, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 81/10 (2010) [hereinafter Wayne Smith
Brief], https://www.bc.edu/content/dam/files/centers/humanrights/pdf/Smith-Armendariz
_Merits_Brief_FINAL1.pdf [https://perma.cc/7HMH-76SH].





186. Wayne Smith Brief, supra note 180, at 19.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 19–20.
189. Id. at 20.
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and stayed in touch with his parole officer.190 Mr. Smith and his wife,
Ann Smith, established “H&S New Construction Cleaning”; employed
around fifteen people, many of whom were recovering from an ad-
diction; bought a family home; and paid taxes.191
Deportation proceedings were initiated against Mr. Smith in
1996, and he was ultimately found to be mandatorily deportable for
his drug conviction, which meant he had no opportunity to plead the
equities outlined above as a defense against deportation.192 Mr. Smith
unlawfully reentered the United States in 1999, after he received
news that his family was struggling and desperately needed his
support, but he was arrested and once again summarily removed
when his prior removal order was reinstated in 2001.193 This led Mr.
Smith to file a petition before the Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights in 2002.194
The Inter-American Commission is a regional human rights
body of the Organization of American States (OAS) with a mandate
to promote and protect human rights in OAS Member States.195 Nota-
bly, the Inter-American Commission has authority to consider indi-
vidual petitions against all OAS Member States for violations of the
rights enshrined in the American Declaration.196 Accordingly, the
Commission is the only international human rights body that hears
individual cases of human rights abuse against the United States.197
Cases proceed before the Commission through an admissibility stage,
when the Commission makes a determination about certain threshold
jurisdictional requirements, and then a merits stage.198 The merits
stage culminates with a decision whether the state in question vio-
lated its regional human rights obligations under the American Decla-
ration or the American Convention on Human Rights and various
other regional human rights treaties if the state in question has rati-
fied those instruments.199 Cases against the United States proceed
only under the rights enshrined in the American Declaration be-
cause it has not ratified any of the regional human rights treaties.200
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Wayne Smith, Hugo Armendariz, et al. v. United States, Case 12.562, Inter-Am.
Comm’n H.R., Report No. 81/10, ¶ 15 (2010).
193. Id. ¶ 16.
194. Id. ¶ 1.
195. See Caroline Bettinger-López, The Inter-American Human Rights System: A Primer,
42 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. J. POVERTY L. & POL’Y 581, 582–83 (2009).
196. Id. at 583.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 586.
199. Id. at 582–83, 586.
200. Id. at 583.
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The Inter-American Commission declared Mr. Smith’s case
admissible with respect to, among other things, the rights to protec-
tion against abusive attacks on family life (Article V), to establish
a family life (Article VI), to protection for mothers and children
(Article VII), to a fair trial (Article XVIII), and to due process of law
(Article XXVI), and the Commission consolidated the case with a
similar case filed on behalf of Hugo Armendariz.201 This was appro-
priate, inasmuch as the case of Mr. Armendariz had many key
similarities to Mr. Smith’s case.202
Mr. Armendariz was born in Mexico in 1970, came to the United
States when he was just two years old, and became an LPR six
years later.203 Mr. Armendariz lived in the United States his entire
life and never spent a significant amount of time in Mexico, or
learned to read and write in Spanish.204 He married a U.S. citizen,
had one U.S. citizen daughter from a prior relationship for whom he
paid child support, and a U.S. citizen stepdaughter with his wife.205
In 1995, Mr. Armendariz was convicted of possession of cocaine for
sale and related charges, and while he was serving his time in 1996,
immigration authorities began to pursue his deportation.206 By the
time his case was heard, the immigration judge concluded that
IIRAIRA had made Mr. Armendariz mandatorily deportable.207 The
judge therefore declined to consider arguments under 212(c) based
on Mr. Armendariz’ 1994 marriage to a U.S. citizen, his relation-
ships with his stepdaughter and biological daughter, his U.S. citizen
mother, LPR father, and U.S. citizen brother and sisters.208
In its 2010 decision on the merits, the Inter-American Commis-
sion found that the United States had violated both substantive and
procedural human rights protections when it expelled Mr. Smith and
Mr. Armendariz without individualized consideration of their family
life.209 First, the Commission addressed the substantive provisions,
including “protection of the law against abusive attacks upon . . .
family life” (Article V), “the right to establish a family” (Article VI),
and the “special protection” that should be afforded to children
(Article VII).210 The Inter-American Commission first answered the
201. Wayne Smith, Hugo Armendariz, et al. v. United States, Case 12.562, Inter-Am.
Comm’n H.R., Report No. 81/10, ¶¶ 1–2 (2010).
202. Id. ¶¶ 22–23.
203. Id. ¶ 19.
204. Id.
205. Id. ¶¶ 19, 21.
206. Id. ¶ 20.
207. Wayne Smith, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 81/10, at ¶ 20.
208. Id. ¶ 22.
209. Id. ¶¶ 60, 65.
210. Id. ¶¶ 47–60.
2020] FAMILY IN THE BALANCE 59
question of whether immigration enforcement fell within the ambit
of the “abusive attacks” on family life contemplated by the American
Declaration, and found that it did.211
The Commission recognized, on the one hand, the authority of
a state to “maintain public order through the control of entry, resi-
dence and expulsion of removable [noncitizens],” and on the other
that “immigration policy must guarantee to all . . . due process . . .
[and] the right to . . . family, and the right to children to obtain
special means of protection.”212 The Commission observed in this
regard that “in this area neither the scope of action of the State nor
the rights of a noncitizen are absolute,” and “that there must be a
balancing test” that weighs state interests against the right to family
life.213 In this regard, the Commission emphasized that interference
with family life must be necessary to “meet a pressing need to pro-
tect public order,” and that the means must be proportional to the
end.214 Notably, the Commission relied on the jurisprudence of the
HRC and the European Court on the right to family life, and recog-
nized the importance of harmonizing the protection of noncitizens’
right to family life across regional and international human rights
instruments.215 Finally, the Commission emphasized that “special
protection” for children requires a procedural opportunity in any
expulsion proceeding to consider the best interests of children who
would be separated from parents subject to removal.216
In applying these human rights principles to the U.S. system of
mandatory deportation, the Commission found that the absence of
any opportunity to present evidence of the impact of their removal
on their family life and children’s rights violated these substantive
protections.217 The Commission rejected the United States’ position
that requiring such a balancing test would impermissibly infringe
on the country’s sovereign rights or “permit criminal aliens to re-
main in the country with impunity simply by establishing family
ties.”218 The Commission emphasized that neither state authority
nor immigrants’ rights are unqualified in this arena, and that “a
211. Id. ¶¶ 47–48.
212. Id. ¶¶ 49–50 (quoting American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man, art.
XXVIII (1948) and IACHR, Report on the Situation of Human Rights of Asylum seekers
within the Canadian Refugee Determination System (2000)).
213. Wayne Smith, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 81/10, at ¶ 51.
214. Id. (quoting IACHR, Report on the Situation of Human Rights of Asylum seekers
within the Canadian Refugee Determination System, ¶ 166 (2000)).
215. Id. ¶¶ 51–54.
216. Id. ¶¶ 56–57.
217. Id. ¶¶ 58–60.
218. Id. ¶ 58.
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balancing test is the only mechanism to reach a fair decision be-
tween the competing individual human rights and the needs as-
serted by the State.”219
Next, the Inter-American Commission examined the case in light
of the United States’ human rights obligations to ensure judicial
protection (Article XVIII) and due process (XXVI).220 The Commis-
sion’s decision to consider this case through the lens of procedural
protections was novel, inasmuch as the HRC and European Court
have only ever considered this issue in expulsion proceedings under
the substantive right to family life.221 The Inter-American Commis-
sion specifically found that this was an “independent violation” of
Mr. Smith’s and Mr. Armendariz’ rights due to the absence of any
procedural mechanism for them to present arguments against their
removal related to their right to family life.222
The Commission’s decision specified that the violations of the
right to family life, special protections for children, and procedural
guarantees arose from the absence of any balancing test under the
law.223 It ordered the United States to amend its laws to ensure that
resident noncitizens’ right to family life are guaranteed in removal
proceedings and provide individualized consideration of the equities
in each case.224 This means that every expulsion case in the United
States that denies a noncitizen the opportunity to provide evidence
of family life as a defense against expulsion constitutes a human
rights violation. Accordingly, any case of mandatory deportation, or
any situation in which the immigration judge is prevented from
considering evidence of family life due to the conviction of certain
crimes, results in a violation of human rights. The following section
will demonstrate how this Inter-American rule resonates with
identical rules from the European and UN human rights systems.
B. Balancing Family Life Against Sovereign Immigration Authority
The right to family life envisioned by the Universal Declaration
was also reiterated in the International Covenant on Civil and Poli-
tical Rights (ICCPR).225 The Covenant incorporates almost verbatim
219. Wayne Smith, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 81/10, at ¶ 58. 
220. Id. ¶ 61.
221. Id. ¶¶ 61–65.
222. Id. ¶¶ 64–65.
223. Id. ¶ 66.
224. Id. ¶ 67.4.
225. Compare International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights arts. 17, 23, Dec. 16,
1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR], with G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Decla-
ration of Human Rights, art. 16 (Dec. 10, 1948).
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the Universal Declaration when it provides that “the family is the
natural and fundamental group unit of society . . . entitled to protec-
tion by society and the State.”226 The Human Rights Committee
(HRC) has interpreted this right to include “the adoption of appro-
priate measures . . . to ensure the unity or reunification of families,
particularly when their members are separated for political, economic
or similar reasons.”227 Article 17 of the ICCPR protects against
“arbitrary or unlawful interference with . . . privacy, family, home
or correspondence,” and the HRC has also extended this protection
to the immigration context.228 Specifically, the HRC has suggested
that “in certain circumstances, an alien may enjoy the protection of
the Covenant even in relation to entry or residence, for example,
when . . . respect for family life arise.”229 The question, then, is what
are the “certain circumstances” contemplated by the ICCPR that
might compel States to permit entry or residence of migrants in a
manner protective of the right to family life.230
The European Court asks a similar question in evaluating
whether actions by the Council of Europe Member States violate the
right to family life envisioned in Article 8 of the European Conven-
tion on Human Rights (ECHR).231 Like the Universal Declaration,
the American Declaration, and the ICCPR, the ECHR’s Article 8
ensures that “[e]veryone has the right to respect for his private and
family life” and protects that family life from “interference by a
public authority” in certain circumstances.232 The ECHR articulates
the parameters for such interference in the text of the treaty, where
it provides that it must be “in accordance with the law and . . .
necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national secu-
rity, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the
prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or mor-
als, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.”233
226. ICCPR, supra note 225, at art. 23.
227. H.R. Comm., Compilation of General Comments and General Recommendations
adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies, U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.1, at 29–30 (July 29,
1994).
228. Id. at 20.
229. Id. at 19 (stating that “[t]he Covenant does not recognize the right of aliens to
enter or reside in the territory of a State party . . . [h]owever, in certain circumstances
an alien may enjoy the protection of the Covenant even in relation to entry or residence,
for example, when considerations of . . . respect for family life arise.”).
230. Id.
231. EUR. CT. H.R., GUIDE ON ARTICLE 8 OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN
RIGHTS: RIGHT TO RESPECT FOR PRIVATE AND FAMILY LIFE, HOME AND CORRESPONDENCE
82 (2020) [hereinafter GUIDE ON ARTICLE 8 OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN
RIGHTS], https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Guide_Art_8_ENG.pdf [https://perma.cc
/92UQ-LHBV].
232. European Convention on Human Rights art. 8, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221.
233. ICCPR, supra note 225, at art. 8.
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The European Court will often conduct a two-prong review of an
alleged Article 8 violation, following the structure of the article
itself.234 First, the Court will consider the case under Article 8.1, and
decide whether there was government interference with family
life.235 This includes an inquiry into the specific family ties at issue,
and it is well-established that the Court only considers the nuclear
family to receive the protection of family life.236 The Court tends to
move through this first prong of analysis fairly quickly, and then
moves to the Article 8.2 question whether the interference was
“necessary in a democratic society,” and therefore permitted by the
ECHR.237 This inquiry parallels the HRC inquiry into the “certain
circumstances” in which the ICCPR may compel a state to reunify
noncitizens or stay an expulsion to maintain family unity.238 The
following subsections consider both European Court and HRC juris-
prudence on the right to family life in three scenarios, including
transnational family reunification, expulsion for immigration law
violations, and expulsion for criminal law violations.
1. Immigrant Admissions and Family Life
Studies have shown that almost one third of the global population
of migrants initially transited international borders to reunify with
family members.239 Among the industrialized nations of the Organi-
sation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD),240 family
reunification and formation together with accompanying family mem-
bers account for 38% of permanent migration, and this rate has been
increasing since 2015.241 Beyond this unmistakable trend in how and
why global migration occurs, scholars have recognized that such mi-
grants enjoy relevant international law protections for the family.242
234. GUIDE ON ARTICLE 8 OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, supra
note 231, at 6.
235. Id.
236. Id. (noting how the protection of “private life” under the same article protects the
unity of extended family and non-traditional families). See id. at 26–27 (stating that the
scope of “private life” protections include protections for relationships between adults and
children with no biological ties, protections for medically assisted procreation, protections
for adopted families even outside standard procedure, and protections for embryos).
237. Id. at 12.
238. See H.R. Comm. supra note 227, at 11, 29–30.
239. Chetail, supra note 169, at 41.
240. Member Countries, ORG. OF ECON.CO-OPERATION&DEV., http://www.oecd.org/about
/membersandpartners [https://perma.cc/X6LH-3J4B].
241. ORG. OF ECON.CO-OPERATION &DEV., INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION OUTLOOK 2018:
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION MOVEMENTS AND POLICIES 21
(2018), https://read.oecd-ilibrary.org/social-issues-migration-health/international-migra
tion-outlook-2018_migr_outlook-2018-en#page20 [https://perma.cc/EQ75-D74P].
242. Chetail, supra note 169, at 41 (citing J. Vedsted-Hansen, Migration and the Right
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The European Court is the only human rights body to seriously
consider the contours of the human right to transnational family re-
unification in a trilogy of cases, including Sen v. the Netherlands,243
Gül v. Switzerland,244 and Ahmut v. the Netherlands.245 Sen v. the
Netherlands concerned two Turkish nationals who held residence
permits in the Netherlands and who wanted to reunify with their
daughter.246 Zeki Sen immigrated to the Netherlands in 1977, and
married his wife Güllden Sen in Turkey in 1980, who subsequently
succeeded in immigrating to the Netherlands with her husband in
1986.247 The Sens had one child, Sinem, in Turkey in 1983, and
Güllden left Sinem in her aunt’s custody at the age of three when
Güllden moved to the Netherlands to join her husband.248 In the
Netherlands, the Sens proceeded to have two more children, born in
1990 and 1994 respectively.249 The Sens’ petition to gain residence
for Sinem was denied, with the Netherlands concluding that the
family bond between the parents and the child had been broken when
they left her in her aunt’s custody.250 The matter was then presented
to the European Court as a violation of the family’s rights under
Article 8 of the ECHR.251
The European Court proceeded through the two-part analysis,
finding first that there was a family life between the Sens and their
daughter in Turkey, and that refusal by the Netherlands to issue
her a residence permit constituted “interference” for purposes of the
Convention.252 The Court’s inquiry into whether the interference
was justified by some conventional reason was characteristically
fact-based,253 and looked both at the circumstances of the family
separation as well as the possible repercussions for reunifying the
to Family and Private Life, in Mondialisation, migration et droits de l’homme 722 (Vincent
Chetail, ed., 2007)).
243. Sen v. the Netherlands, 36 Eur. Ct. H.R. 7 (2001).
244. Gül v. Switzerland, App. Np. 23218/94, 1996-I Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 159
(1994).
245. Ahmut v. the Netherlands, App. No. 21702/93, 1996-VI Eur. Comm’n H.R. 579
(1996).
246. See Sen v. the Netherlands, 12 Hum. Rts. Case Dig. 963, 963 (2001). This discus-
sion relies on the facts of the case presented in this case digest because the judgement





251. Id. at 964.
252. See Ryan T. Mrazik & Andrew I. Schoenholtz, Protecting and Promoting the
Human Right to Respect for Family Life: Treaty-Based Reform and Domestic Advocacy,
24 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 651, 657 (2010).
253. See id.
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family in Turkey.254 Specifically, the Court noted that the Sens had
voluntarily left Sinem in Turkey, and that she had developed strong
cultural ties with her country of nationality.255 However, the Court
noted that the possibility of family reunification in Turkey was made
difficult because of the Sens’ deep ties in the Netherlands, which
included two children born and raised there.256 The Court concluded
that the hardship of moving the entire family unit to Turkey posed
too much of a burden, particularly for the children born in the
Netherlands, and that the most appropriate way to protect the right
to family life was for Sinem to migrate to the Netherlands.257
The European Court’s decision in Sen v. the Netherlands con-
firms that there are circumstances in which the human right to
family life will require a state to admit an immigrant to its territory
over the state’s objection.258 The circumstances in Sen, however,
suggest that the right to family life in the family reunification context
is limited, and this is confirmed by two other cases in which the
European Court found no violation of family life in the reunification
context.259 Specifically, the European Court decided Gül v. Switzerland
and Ahmut v. the Netherlands in 1996 and upheld the authority of
Switzerland and the Netherlands, respectively, to deny residency
permits to children who wanted to reunite with their parents.260
In Gül v. Switzerland, two Turkish nationals who had estab-
lished residency in Switzerland petitioned for their son to join them
and were denied.261 In this case, Mr. Gül left his wife and two chil-
dren to seek asylum in Switzerland and was able to obtain residency
notwithstanding the denial of his asylum claim.262 Mrs. Gül had
joined him a few years later on a humanitarian permit to secure
medical services, and they next applied for a residency permit for one
of their sons.263 The European Court found in this case that “there
were no obstacles to the development of a family life in Turkey,” and
that the circumstances did not require reunification against the will
of the state.264 Similarly, in Ahmut v. the Netherlands, a Moroccan
man, Ahmut, sought permission for his son, Souffiane, to enter the
254. See id. at 662.
255. Sen v. the Netherlands, 12 Hum. Rts. Case Dig. 963, 964 (2001).
256. Id. at 964–65.
257. See id. at 965.
258. Id.
259. Mrazik & Schoenholtz, supra note 252, at 662–63.
260. Id.




2020] FAMILY IN THE BALANCE 65
Netherlands after his ex-wife passed away in Morocco and left his
five children in the care of her mother.265 Ahmut attained citizen-
ship in Morocco in 1990, the same year that Souffiane came to live
with him in the Netherlands, but was subsequently denied a resi-
dency permit.266 Ultimately, the European Court found no violation
of family life because there was no significant impediment to the
enjoyment of family life in Morocco.267
Comparing Sen with Gül and Ahmut, it is evident that the Court’s
conclusion about the appropriate locus of family life is a significant
factor in cases about family reunification.268 Indeed, in Sen, the
Court considered that both parents had established residency in the
Netherlands and two of their children had been born and educated
there, supporting a conclusion that the Netherlands was the locus
of family life.269 While Sinem was born and raised in Turkey, mak-
ing that an appropriate locus for her life, the Court believed that it
would be too onerous for the parents and two siblings to join her
there, making the Netherlands the appropriate locus of their family
life.270 In contrast, the parents in Gül were not permanent residents
in Switzerland and they possessed cultural and linguistic connec-
tions to Turkey, leading the Court to conclude in that case that
nothing prevented them from developing their family life in Turkey.271
Similarly, in Ahmut, the child lived in Morocco and had family there,
whereas his father was alone in the Netherlands and still had sub-
stantial connections to Morocco, including citizenship, making
Morocco the most appropriate locus for family life.272 Accordingly, a
reasoned consideration of the proper locus of family life is central to
a determination about whether an immigration admissions decision
violated that right under Article 8.273
The Court’s concern for the best interest of the child in these
cases is manifest. This includes both an interest in being close to
parents and other family members, as well as an interest in living
in the context where the child is “at home” culturally and linguisti-
cally.274 In both Gül and Ahmut, the Court emphasized that the
children had lived in their respective countries of nationality their
265. Mrazik & Schoenholtz, supra note 252, at 661.
266. Id. at 661–62.
267. Id. at 662.
268. See id. at 661–62 (discussing the Court’s analysis in each of the cases).
269. See Sen v. the Netherlands, 12 Hum. Rts. Case Dig. 963, 965 (2001).
270. Mrazik & Schoenholtz, supra note 252, at 662–63.
271. Id. at 661.
272. See id. at 661–62.
273. Id.
274. Id. at 653, 666.
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whole lives and had been acculturated there.275 In Sen, the Court
made a similar finding about Sinem’s cultural and linguistic com-
fort, but also considered the best interest of Sinem’s two siblings
born in the Netherlands.276 This, perhaps more than any other
factor, appears to account for the different outcomes in these cases.
Specifically with regard to the best interest of the child, the
main UN instrument in this regard is the Convention on the Rights
of the Child (CRC), and that treaty requires that “applications by a
child or his or her parents to enter or leave a State Party for the
purpose of family reunification” are dealt with in a “positive, hu-
mane and expeditious manner.”277 This guarantee is both substan-
tive and procedural in nature, and it suggests favorable treatment
of such requests.278 Moreover, the near universal ratification of this
instrument suggests that such principles may be on their way to
attaining the status of customary international law.279 Notably, some
scholars have gone so far as to argue that a customary international
law norm already exists to facilitate the reunification of a minor
child with her parents lawfully residing in the country of immigra-
tion.280 While controversial in the family reunification context, it is
much more difficult to dispute the evolution of a customary interna-
tional law norm that requires the consideration of family life in
expulsion cases that would permanently remove one member of a
nuclear family.281 The subsections that follow consider the right to
family life in cases of expulsion for civil immigration law violations
as well as criminal law violations.
2. Unauthorized Immigration and Family Life
The HRC has resolved a number of individual cases involving
the right to family life as a defense against expulsion, and in so
doing, it has articulated a very progressive framework for protection
of unauthorized migrants.282 For example, the HRC has found that
an undocumented immigrant who has established substantial family
275. Id. at 667.
276. See Mrazik & Schoenholtz, supra note 252, at 667.
277. G. A. Res. 44/25, art. 10(1) (Nov. 20, 1989).
278. Chetail, supra note 169, at 45.
279. Id. at 46.
280. See id. at 44.
281. Id.
282. See, e.g., Hum. Rts. Comm., 98th Sess., ¶¶ 11.1(a)–(b), 14.3-17. U.N. Doc. CCPR/C
/98/D/1246/2004 (Mar. 25, 2010); Rep. of the Hum. Rts. Comm., ¶¶ 8.1–8.3, U.N. Doc. A
/64/40 (Vol. II) (2009); Hum. Rts. Comm., 81st Sess., ¶¶ 9.7–10, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/81/D
/1011/2001 (2004) [hereinafter Madafferi v. Australia].
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ties should not be deported unless the state has a significant inter-
est beyond immigration regulation.283 In another case involving an
undocumented immigrant with family ties, the HRC found that the
fact that the individual had withheld information about prior crimi-
nal conduct in his country of nationality during the initial immigra-
tion process did not justify expulsion.284 A close examination of these
cases provides meaningful insight into the scope of the family life
defense against expulsion.
In Winata v. Australia, Hendrik Winata and So Lan Li, a couple
who had overstayed their visas and remained in Australia without
authorization, contested the denial of their visa applications as a
violation of their right to family life.285 Hendrik had lived in Austra-
lia since 1985, and So Lan since 1987.286 Both had overstayed their
visas, and the couple had an Australian citizen son who was born
during their unauthorized stay.287 The HRC indicated that no Cove-
nant violation necessarily occurs from denying visas to immigrants
who overstay their visas and remain without authorization, even if
the couple has a child with citizenship in the country in question.288
However, where the couple has lived with their child in the country
for a substantial period of time, in this case thirteen years, the HRC
found “it is incumbent on the State party to demonstrate additional
factors justifying the removal of both parents that go beyond a
simple enforcement of its immigration law in order to avoid a char-
acterization of arbitrariness.”289 The HRC concluded that removal
in this case would violate the right to family life.290 The HRC recom-
mended that Australia re-examine the visa applications “with due
consideration given to the protection required by [the couple’s child’s]
status as a minor.”291 The HRC further found that Australia was
under an obligation to ensure that similar violations did not occur
in the future.292
The HRC further expanded the protection of family life in
Madafferi v. Australia, where it found Australia’s decision to deport
Francesco Madafferi away from his Australian wife and four children
283. See, e.g., Hum. Rts. Comm., 72nd Sess., ¶¶ 7.1–7.3, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/72/D/930
/2000 (Aug. 16, 2001) [hereinafter Winata v. Australia].
284. Madafferi v. Australia, Hum. Rts. Comm., 98th Sess. at ¶ 9.8.
285. Winata v. Australia, Hum. Rts. Comm., 72nd Sess., at ¶¶ 2.1, 2.6.
286. Id. ¶ 2.1.
287. Id. ¶¶ 2.1–2.2.
288. Id. ¶ 7.3.
289. Id.
290. Id.
291. Winata v. Australia, Hum. Rts. Comm., 72nd Sess., at ¶ 9.
292. Id.
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violated his right to family life.293 Francesco had entered Australia
on a tourist visa in 1989, but let his visa expire as he made plans to
marry Anna Maria Madafferi, an Australian national.294 Francesco
believed he derived legal residency automatically due to his mar-
riage, and remained without authorization for fourteen years, during
which time he had four Australian children with Anna Maria.295 In
1996, Francesco came to the attention of immigration authorities,
which denied his application for a spousal visa due to his revelation
that he had a criminal record in his native Italy.296 Appeals over the
next six years resulted in a final expulsion order, and Francesco
presented his case to the HRC alleging a violation of his right to
family life.297
In reviewing the case, the HRC invoked the familiar refrain
that Australia’s legitimate desire to deport noncitizens who violate
immigration laws should be balanced against the harm a deporta-
tion will have on the family of the person deported.298 First, the HRC
considered that Francesco’s criminal conduct in Italy had occurred
twenty years prior, that the convictions had been extinguished, and
there were no outstanding warrants.299 Next, the HRC considered
that it would be exceedingly burdensome for Anna Maria and their
four children to move to Italy, particularly considering the age of the
children.300 Ultimately, the HRC concluded that the removal of
Francesco would violate the ICCPR protection from arbitrary inter-
ference with the family, in conjunction with special protections for
children and the family unit.301
Like the HRC, the European Court has developed a rich body
of jurisprudence on the right to family life as a defense against ex-
pulsion by unauthorized migrants,302 but for purposes of this discus-
sion it is important to note that the European Court understands
family life to be limited to the nuclear family.303 Specifically, the
293. Madafferi v. Australia, Hum. Rts. Comm., 72nd Sess., at ¶ 9.8.
294. Id. ¶¶ 2.1–2.2.
295. Id. ¶ 2.2.
296. Id. ¶¶ 2.3–2.4.
297. Id. ¶¶ 2.5–3.1.
298. See id. ¶ 9.8.
299. Madafferi v. Australia, Hum. Rts. Comm., 72nd Sess., at ¶ 9.8.
300. Id.
301. Id. (finding a violation of Article 17.1 “in conjunction with article 23, of the Covenant
in respect of all of the authors, and additionally, a violation of article 24, paragraph 1,
in relation to the four minor children due to a failure to provide them with the necessary
measures of protection as minors”).
302. See GUIDE ON ARTICLE 8 OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, supra
note 231, at 82.
303. Id. at 63.
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Court has found that family life exists between spouses, and that
children born of spouses are automatically part of that family life.304
While adult children are not generally considered to have a family
life with their parents and siblings,305 the Court has accepted that
young adults may still have a family life with their parents and other
close family members if they have not yet established their own
families.306 Notably, the European Court will consider interference
in the relationship between non-nuclear family members under Article
8 as a violation of private life.307 Because of this fairly precise delin-
eation between relationships as family life and those protected as
private life, it is important to examine how the European Court
understands the limits of the nuclear family.
In Berrehab v. the Netherlands, the European Court demonstrated
a flexible approach to family life, even within the more conservative
confines of the nuclear family.308 In that case, Abdellah Berrehab,
a Moroccan national, had initially established residency in the Nether-
lands through his marriage to Sonja Koster, a Dutch citizen.309 How-
ever, the couple divorced a couple years later just as their daughter
was born, and the Netherlands rejected Abdellah’s request to renew
his visa, notwithstanding the birth of his daughter.310 Abdellah
maintained visitation while he fought his deportation, but was ul-
timately deported and unable to continue a regular visitation sched-
ule as a result.311 Abdellah was then able to secure a one-month
permit to visit his daughter, and after he returned, he and Sonja
remarried, which then served as the basis for a residency permit.312
Abdellah filed a case before the European Court arguing that his
deportation had been in violation of his right to family life, and the
Court found that family life did exist with his daughter notwith-
standing his divorce from his wife and non-custodial relationship
with his daughter.313 The Court went on to find that his deportation
violated his right to family life.314
304. See Berrehab v. the Netherlands, 138 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 14 (1989); see also
Abdulaziz v. United Kingdom, 94 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 32 (1985).
305. See GUIDE ON ARTICLE 8 OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, supra
note 231, at 83 (citing Kwakye-Nti and Dufie v. the Netherlands, App. No. 31519/96 Eur.
Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep. (2000)).
306. Maslov v. Austria, 2008-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 301, 321.
307. Slivenko v. Latvia, 2003-X Eur. Ct. H.R. 229, 232.
308. Berrehab v. the Netherlands, 138 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at ¶ 21 (1989).
309. Id. ¶¶ 7–8.
310. Id. ¶¶ 9–10.
311. Id. ¶¶ 9, 12.
312. Id. ¶ 13.
313. Id. ¶¶ 17, 21.
314. Berrehab, 138 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at ¶ 29.
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In Jeunesse v. the Netherlands, Meriam Jeunesse challenged her
order of deportation arising from her visa overstay because it violated
her right to family life.315 Meriam was born and raised in Suriname,
and had Dutch nationality until Suriname’s independence in 1975.316
She began a relationship with a man from Suriname (Mr. W) in the
early 1990s, and when he moved to the Netherlands and acquired
Dutch nationality, she made repeated attempts to join him.317 She
finally succeeded in 1997 when she received a visitor visa for forty-
five days, after which time she remained in the Netherlands and
never returned to Suriname.318 Meriam married Mr. W in 1999, and
they subsequently had three children in 2000, 2005, and 2010, while
she continued to work to regularize her immigration status.319
Meriam filed her case with the European Court after years of litiga-
tion to defend her right to family life in the Netherlands.320
The European Court recognized the complexity of a case where
the family life asserted in defense against expulsion was developed
during a noncitizen’s unauthorized stay in the country of immigra-
tion.321 The Court noted that a State is under no obligation to permit
a noncitizen to remain in country awaiting the decision on a resi-
dence permit, but if the State does permit physical presence, it must
recognize that social and family connections may follow.322 The
Court emphasized, however, that a state is under no obligation to
recognize a family unity claim in such circumstances.323 The Court
distinguished this type of case from that of a “settled migrant,” like
those in which residents are deemed deportable because of criminal
conduct, and where the Court must ensure that “fair balance has
been struck between the grounds underlying the authorities’ deci-
sion to withdraw the right of residence and the Article 8 rights of
the individual concerned.”324 The Court approaches such cases in a
manner similar to reunification cases where it considers whether
315. Jeunesse v. the Netherlands, 60 Eur. Ct. H.R., at ¶¶ 13, 76–77 (2015).
316. Id. ¶ 9.
317. Id. ¶¶ 9–10, 12.
318. Id. ¶ 13.
319. Id. ¶¶ 16, 18, 41.
320. See id. ¶¶ 1, 100.
321. See Jeunesse, 60 Eur. Ct. H.R., at ¶¶ 100–03.
322. Id. ¶ 103 (citing Chandra v. the Netherlands, App. No. 53102/99 (May 13, 2003);
Benamar v. the Netherlands, App. No. 43786/04 (Apr. 5, 2005); Priya v. Denmark, App.
No. 13594/03 (July 6, 2006); Rodrigues da Silva v. the Netherlands, 2006-I Eur. Ct. H.R.
(2006); Omoregie v. Norway, App. No. 265/07, § 64 (July 31, 2008); and B.V. v. Sweden,
App. No. 57442/11 (Nov. 13, 2012)).
323. Jeunesse, 60 Eur. Ct. H.R., at ¶ 103.
324. Id. ¶ 104.
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the state has a “positive obligation” to grant residency, as compared
to a negative obligation not to rescind permission to reside.325
While the Court recognized that the distinction between a
state’s positive and negative obligations in immigration cases that
implicate the right to family life is difficult to define with precision,
it set forth the following considerations for such cases:
[1] the extent to which family life would effectively be ruptured,
[2] the extent of the ties in the Contracting State, [3] whether there
are insurmountable obstacles in the way of the family living in
the country of origin of the alien concerned and [4] whether there
are factors of immigration control (for example, a history of
breaches of immigration law) or considerations of public order
weighing in favour of exclusion.326
Moreover, the Court acknowledged the unique circumstances in
which family ties are formed during the pendency of a noncitizen’s
request to reside and provided that States may consider that such
ties were formed when the possibility to remain was uncertain or
precarious.327 Where this is the case, the Court asserts that “it is
likely only to be in exceptional circumstances that the removal of
the non-national family member will constitute a violation of Article
8.”328 At the same time, the Court recognized the established princi-
ple under international law that all decisions that involve children
must adequately account for their best interest.329
In Meriam Jeunesse’s case, the European Court found such
“exceptional circumstances.”330 The Court first emphasized that all
members of Meriam’s family were nationals of the Netherlands with
a right to enjoy their family life in the country of their nationality,
and that she held Dutch nationality as a child that she lost auto-
matically when Suriname became independent.331 Then the Court
considered that she had lived in the Netherlands for sixteen years
with no criminal incidents, and that Dutch authorities tolerated her
presence for this entire time while it completed consideration of her
residency request.332 Whereas the Court acknowledged that nothing
prevented Meriam’s husband and three children from accompanying
325. See id. ¶ 105 (citing Ahmut v. the Netherlands, 1996-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. at § 63
(1996)).
326. Id. ¶ 107.
327. Id. ¶ 108.
328. Id.
329. See Jeunesse, 60 Eur. Ct. H.R., at ¶ 109.
330. Id. ¶ 122.
331. Id. ¶ 115.
332. Id. ¶ 116.
72 WM. & MARY J. RACE, GENDER & SOC. JUST. [Vol. 27:033
her to Suriname, it found that they would “experience a degree of
hardship if they were forced to do so.”333 Finally, the Court consid-
ered the impact of the decision to deport Meriam on her children to
be an important feature of the case, and the Court recognized that
she was the primary caretaker for the children and that rupturing
that relationship would be disruptive.334 Ultimately, the Court found
this to be an exceptional case, that the Netherlands did not ade-
quately balance the necessary considerations, and that it violated
its Article 8 obligations as a result.335
There are a number of important themes that emerge from this
review of the HRC and European Court jurisprudence. First, there
are different conceptions of family that are relevant to “family life”
under the relevant human rights instruments.336 However, there is
consensus that the nuclear family, including a spouse and children,
is always proper when considering state interference with family
life.337 Second, the standard used by the European Court in assess-
ing the family life claims of noncitizens who form families during a
period of unauthorized presence seems more onerous than that
applied by the HRC.338 Nevertheless, there is a clear consensus that
family life must always be considered as part of an individualized
decision whether to let an unauthorized immigrant remain, even if
only exceptional cases may merit protection in Europe.339 Finally, at
least in the European jurisprudence, there appears to be a meaning-
ful distinction between the situations of unauthorized immigrants
and lawful residents who engage in conduct that makes them
deportable.340 For that reason, the next section reviews the body of
jurisprudence that, like the Wayne Smith case discussed in the
previous section, concerns the state’s obligation to consider the family
life of noncitizens who violate criminal laws.
3. Criminal Law Violations and Family Life
The HRC specifically addressed the State’s interest in the ex-
pulsion of noncitizens who commit crimes in Dauphin v. Canada.341
In that case, John Michaël Dauphin was a Haitian national who had
333. Id. ¶ 117.
334. Id. ¶ 118.
335. See Jeunesse, 60 Eur. Ct. H.R., at ¶¶ 122–23.
336. Id. ¶ 106.
337. Id. ¶ 115.
338. See id. ¶¶ 101–03.
339. Id. ¶ 107.
340. Id. ¶ 104.
341. Dauphin v. Canada, Comm. No. 1792/2008, U.N. Doc. A/64/40, ¶¶ 2.1–2.4 (2009).
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resided in Canada since the age of two, and believed himself to be
a Canadian citizen until he was convicted of robbery with violence
at the age of eighteen and sentenced to thirty-three months in
prison.342 Canadian authorities found John Michaël deportable for
his crime, and disregarded his argument that he had no family in
Haiti, as his parents, brothers, and sisters had all acquired Canadian
citizenship.343 In considering whether the deportation of John Michaël
would violate his right to family life under the ICCPR, the HRC
made important findings both with regard to the interference and
proportionality prongs of the family life analysis.344
First, the HRC found that John Michaël’s parents and siblings
were his family for purposes of Article 17 protection, and considered
his young age and that he had no family in Haiti in concluding that
his deportation would constitute interference with his family life.345
Second, as the HRC acknowledged the legitimate aim of deportation
as a public safety measure, it found that Canada must consider that
John Michaël committed his single criminal offense when he was
only eighteen.346 Ultimately, the HRC found that John Michaël would
suffer “drastic effects” if deported from Canada, where he had his
whole family, to Haiti, where he had no one, and concluded that his
removal would be disproportionate to the legitimate aims of the
Canadian state and, therefore, in violation of his family life under
the ICCPR.347
Whereas the HRC clearly recognizes the authority of the state
to promote public safety through the expulsion of persons convicted of
crimes, it is clear these government interests cannot be advanced
without regard to family life.348 Indeed, the HRC requires that the
State consider the length of time that an immigrant has resided in the
country of immigration, the extent of family ties in the country of
immigration, as well as the country of nationality.349 These con-
siderations must be weighed against the government’s interests in
promoting public safety, and deportation may be considered dispro-
portionate in a wide variety of circumstances where substantial
family ties would be compromised.350
342. Id. ¶¶ 2.1, 8.2.
343. Id. ¶ 2.2.
344. Id. ¶ 8.4.
345. Id. ¶ 8.3 (relying on HRC General Comments 16 and 19, recalling “the concept
of the family is to be interpreted broadly”).
346. Id. ¶ 8.4.
347. Dauphin, U.N. Doc. A/64/40, at ¶ 8.4 (finding that his deportation would violate
both Articles 17 and 23, paragraph 1 of the ICCPR).
348. Id. ¶ 8.3.
349. Id.
350. See Jeunesse v. the Netherlands, 60 Eur. Ct. H.R. at ¶ 104 (2015).
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The European Court has also developed a body of jurisprudence
addressing balancing the right to family life against the authority
of the state to expel noncitizens convicted of crimes.351 Notably, as
a number of European States have passed legislation that prohibits
the expulsion of long-term immigrants who were born in the state or
arrived at a young age, the European Court has not found an abso-
lute defense against removal for such persons under the ECHR.352
Rather, the European Court has recognized the right of a State
party to the ECHR to expel resident immigrants for criminal activ-
ity, but insists that such expulsions must be proportionate in light
of the likely effects of such interference with the deportee’s family
life.353 Whereas the Court has adopted the notion of balancing set
forth by the HRC, it has been more specific about the appropriate
framework for analysis.354
European Court cases fall into two broad categories, including
young offenders whose main familial connection is to parents and
siblings, and offenders who have a spouse and children.355 The Court
has referred to younger offenders who do not have a spouse and
children as “second generation” noncitizens, and generally the Court
considers their cases under the “private life” provision of Article 8.356
In such cases, the Court has indicated that it will consider:
[1] the nature and gravity of the offences committed by the appli-
cant; [2] the length of his stay in the host country; [3] the period
which elapsed between the commission of the offences and the
impugned measure and the applicant’s conduct during that period;
[and] [4] the solidity of social, cultural and family ties with the
host country and with the country of destination.357
In Moustaquim v. Belgium, the Court applied this analysis and
found a violation of Article 8 where the young offender had as many
as twenty-two convictions for theft crimes.358 Notably, the Court has
also upheld deportations where the crimes of “second generation”
immigrants are especially severe “such as rape or armed robbery,
for which unconditional prison terms of five or more years had been
imposed.”359 Regardless of the severity of the crime, the European
351. Id.
352. See U ner v. the Netherlands, App. No. 46410/99 ¶ 57 (Oct. 18, 2006).
353. Id. ¶¶ 57–59.
354. Id. ¶¶ 58–59.
355. Maslov v. Austria (First Section), App. No. 1638/03, ¶ 36 (Mar. 22, 2007).
356. Id.
357. Id.
358. Moustaquim v. Belgium (A/193) App. No. 12313/86, ¶ 15 (Feb. 18, 1991).
359. Maslov v. Austria, App. No. 1638/03, ¶ 40 (June 23, 2008) (citing Bouchelkia v.
France, App. No. 1638/03, ¶ 65 (Jan. 29, 1997) and Boujlifa v. France, App. No. 25404.94
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Court consistently requires a balancing of the noncitizen’s family
ties against the state interests in expulsion.360
In those cases involving noncitizens who have established their
family life in the country of immigration, with a spouse and chil-
dren, the Court considers:
[1] the nature and seriousness of the offence committed by the
applicant; [2] the length of the applicant’s stay in the country
from which he or she is to be expelled; [3] the time elapsed since
the offence was committed and the applicant’s conduct during
that period; [4] the nationalities of the various persons con-
cerned; [5] the applicant’s family situation, such as the length of
the marriage, and other factors expressing the effectiveness of
a couple’s family life; [6] whether the spouse knew about the
offense at the time when he or she entered into a family relation-
ship; [7] whether there are children of the marriage, and if so,
their age; [8] the seriousness of the difficulties which the spouse
is likely to encounter in the country to which the applicant is to
be expelled; and [9] the best interests and well-being of the chil-
dren, in particular the seriousness of the difficulties which any
children of the applicant are likely to encounter in the country
to which the applicant is to be expelled.361
Cases in which the Court has applied these considerations are
illustrative.
In Kolonja v. Greece, Greece moved to expel an Albanian national
of Greek origin who had lived in Greece for several years before
being sentenced to seven years in prison for a drug conviction.362
Stefan Kolonja was married to a Greek national and had two Greek
children, but was nonetheless ordered to be deported to Albania and
permanently banned from reentering Greece.363 Following his depor-
tation, he returned to Greece illegally, and was again deported, at
which point he brought his case to the European Court.364 On balanc-
ing Mr. Kolonja’s family life against the State’s interest in maintain-
ing public safety, the European Court found that both the decision
and the permanent ban on reentry violated his right to family life.365
In this regard, the jurisprudence of the European Court coincides
(Oct. 21, 1997)).
360. Jeunesse v. the Netherlands, 60 Eur. Ct. H.R. at ¶ 121 (2015).
361. Üner v. the Netherlands, App. No. 46410/99, ¶¶ 57–58 (Oct. 18, 2006).




365. Press Release, Eur. Ct. of H.R., Press Release: Judgments and Decisions of 19
May 2016 (2016).
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with that of the HRC and the Inter-American Commission in expul-
sion cases.
Central to all HRC, European Court, and Inter-American cases
involving the noncitizens’ right to family life is the imperative that
states balance the individual right to maintain important family ties
against the legitimate interest of the state to enforce its immigration
laws.366 Indeed, even in the most egregious cases of persistent
unlawful presence,367 return in violation of an immigration ban,368 or
the commission of serious crimes,369 this robust body of international
human rights jurisprudence requires states to balance the noncitizens’
right to family life. The final section of this Article will argue that this
norm has been cemented as customary international law, which the
United States is required to apply, and that the U.S. Supreme Court
erred when it failed to do so in its recent decision in Barton v. Barr.
III. BARTON V. BARR CONTRAVENES CUSTOMARY
INTERNATIONAL LAW
In May 2020, the U.S. Supreme Court issued its decision in
Barton v. Barr, which resolved a circuit split on the proper applica-
tion of the “stop-time” rule for cancellation of removal.370 That rule
establishes that the accrual of seven years of continuous residence
(LPR cancellation) or ten years of continuous physical presence
(non-LPR cancellation) will terminate with either the initiation of
removal proceedings or the commission of an enumerated criminal
offense.371 The issue in Barton concerned the proper interpretation
of the second provision, which terminates the requisite continuous
period for cancellation of removal:
when the alien has committed an offense referred to in section
1182(a)(2) of this title that renders the alien inadmissible to the
United States under section 1182(a)(2) of this title or removable
from the United States under section 1227(a)(2) or 1227(a)(4) of
this title, whichever is earliest.372
366. H.R. Comm., Compilation of General Comments and General Recommendations
adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies, U.N. Doc. No. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.1, at 19
(July 29, 1994).
367. Jeunesse v. the Netherlands, 60 Eur. Ct. H.R. at ¶ 86.
368. Kolonja v. Greece, App. No. 49441/12, 1 (May 19, 2016), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int
/eng?i=001-162856 [https://perma.cc/8CH4-JP98].
369. Maslov v. Austria, App. No. 1638/03, ¶ 40 (Jun. 23, 2008) (citing Bouchelkia v.
France, App. No. 1638/03, ¶ 65 (Jan. 29, 1997); Boujlifa v. France, App. No. 25404.94
(Oct. 21, 1997)).
370. Barton v. Barr, 140 S. Ct. 1442, 1448, 1454 (2020).
371. 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(d)(1).
372. Id.
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The Supreme Court in Barton considered whether the stop-time
rule is triggered in an LPR cancellation case with the commission
of an offense enumerated in 1182(a)(2).373 The answer to this ques-
tion may appear simple at first blush, and indeed the majority
opinion in Barton suggested that it was,374 but the issue is quite
complex. The complexity relates to a key distinction in immigration
law between noncitizens seeking “admission” to the United States
and noncitizens deemed “deportable” after admission. This distinction
is clear in the INA, and the U.S. Code enumerates grounds of inad-
missibility in section 1182 and grounds of deportability in section
1227.375 Because the stop-time rule applies to both non-LPR cancel-
lation and LPR cancellation, a court could read the statute to stop
the accrual of continuous physical presence when a noncitizen com-
mits an offense enumerated in 1182(a)(2) and is either found inad-
missible under 1182 or deportable under 1227 as a result.376 The
Supreme Court in Barton took a different tack, siding with the BIA
and a majority of circuits that have held that continuous residence
for LPRs is terminated upon the commission of a crime enumerated
in 1182(a)(2), regardless of whether the crime results in a finding of
inadmissibility or deportability.377
The following section will describe the evolution of this dispute
about the proper interpretation of the statute, including the 2006
BIA decision to first address this issue, the Circuit split that emerged,
and the majority and dissenting rationales of the Supreme Court in
Barton. In so doing, the section will reference various rules of statu-
tory interpretation used to justify each court’s resolution of this issue
and identify how different approaches led to different outcomes. The
final section of this Article will identify one rule of statutory inter-
pretation that was omitted by every court to consider this issue,
including the Supreme Court; namely, the Charming Betsy rule.378
According to the Charming Betsy rule of statutory interpretation, a
court should resolve ambiguities in a statute in a manner consistent
with applicable rules of customary international law.379 Inasmuch as
there was one interpretation of this ambiguous statutory provision
373. Barton, 140 S. Ct. at 1442, 1449–50 (finding that “the date of commission of the
offense is the key date for purposes of calculating whether the noncitizen committed a
§ 1182(a)(2) offense during the initial seven years of residence”).
374. Id. at 1450.
375. Id. at 1446.
376. Id. at 1457 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
377. Id. at 1454.
378. Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy (The Charming Betsy Case), 6 U.S. 71, 118
(1804).
379. Id.
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that would have permitted Barton to seek discretionary relief from
removal based on his family life, and another that foreclosed that
possibility, the Court should have chosen the former.
A. Dispute over the Proper Interpretation of the Statute
In Matter of Jurado Delgado, the BIA first addressed the ques-
tion later posed to the Supreme Court in Barton.380 In that case,
Jimmy Roberto Jurado Delgado had been admitted to the United
States as an LPR in 1985, and was convicted in 1997 of “two crimes
involving moral turpitude” that led to the initiation of removal pro-
ceedings.381 Mr. Jurado Delgado had previously been convicted of
retail theft in 1991 and unsworn falsification to authorities in 1992,
but was never charged for those crimes in immigration proceed-
ings.382 The Immigration Judge did not apply the stop-time rule
based on these earlier convictions because they were not included as
charges of removability and granted the application for cancellation
of the removal.383 The DHS appealed, arguing that any crimes that
were contemplated in 1182(a)(2)(A)(I) and committed in the seven-
year period for LPR cancellation should trigger the stop-time rule,
and the BIA agreed.384
The BIA focused on the novelty of the stop-time rule statutory
formulation that the offense 1182(a)(2) “renders the [noncitizen] in-
admissible,” and used the canon of statutory interpretation that re-
quires the consideration of statutory terms in the context of the
statute.385 Specifically, the BIA noted that in other sections of the INA,
Congress used the formulation “is inadmissible” to describe limita-
tions on relief from removal.386 It concluded that to “be rendered inad-
missible” must have a different meaning than to “be inadmissible,”
and decided that it meant the noncitizen could potentially be inad-
missible if so charged.387 Accordingly, because Mr. Jurado Delgado
could potentially be charged with inadmissibility, his commission of
the 1182(a)(2) offenses rendered him inadmissible and precluded
him from pursuing cancellation of removal.388 The BIA therefore held
that a cancellation applicant need not “have been charged with . . . an
offense as a ground of inadmissibility or removability in order for
380. See In re Jurado-Delgado, 24 I. & N. Dec. 29, 29–30 (B.I.A. 2006).
381. Id.
382. Id. at 29.
383. Id. at 30.
384. Id.
385. Id. at 31.
386. In re Jurado-Delgado, 24 I. & N. Dec. 29, 31 (B.I.A. 2006).
387. Id.
388. Id. at 35.
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the provision to stop the . . . accrual of continuous residence.”389
Notably, this interpretation of the statute would trigger the stop-
time rule “when the alien has committed an offense referred to in
section [1182(a)(2) of this title],” and rendered the next two clauses
of the statutory provision superfluous.390
The first U.S. Court of Appeals to address this issue in a pub-
lished decision was the Fifth Circuit in Calix v. Lynch.391 In that
case, Rony Alexander Paz Calix had been admitted to the United
States in December 1997 as an LPR and was convicted for cocaine
possession in 2007 and charged as removable based on that convic-
tion.392 Mr. Paz Calix had also been convicted of possession of mari-
juana in 2001, but was never charged in immigration proceedings
as a result of that conviction.393 An Immigration Judge applied the
stop-time rule to preclude an application for cancellation of removal,
and the BIA upheld that decision on appeal.394 Mr. Paz Calix chal-
lenged the denial in a petition for review to the Fifth Circuit, which
analyzed the statutory language under the Chevron framework.395
The court proceeded to “avail [itself] of the traditional means of
statutory interpretation, which include the text itself, its history,
and its purpose”396 to determine if the statute is ambiguous under
Chevron step one.
Mr. Paz Calix argued that the statute unambiguously estab-
lished his eligibility for cancellation of removal pursuant to the
cannon of statutory interpretation against surplusage, which re-
quires “that a statute must, if possible, be construed in such fashion
that every word has some operative effect.”397 He argued that the
statute required both the commission of the 1182(a)(2) offense, and
that the noncitizen be “rendered” inadmissible under 1182(a)(2).398
He further argued that to apply the stop-time rule based on the
commission of the offense alone would give no operative effect to the
second provision requiring that the noncitizen be “rendered” inad-
missible.399 He urged the court to conclude that 1182(a)(2) would
halt continuous presence or residence only for noncitizens seeking
389. Id. at 31.
390. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(d)(1).
391. Calix v. Lynch, 784 F.3d 1000, 1006–07 (5th Cir. 2015).
392. Id. at 1002.
393. Id.
394. Id. at 1011.
395. Id. at 1005 (citing Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Counsel, Inc., 467
U.S. 837, 842 (1984)).
396. Id. (quoting Bellum v. PCE Constructors, Inc., 407 F.3d 734, 739 (5th Cir. 2005)).
397. Calix, 784 F.3d at 1006 (quoting United States v. Nordic Vill. Inc., 503 U.S. 30,
36 (1992)).
398. Id. at 1006.
399. Id.
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admission and urged the court to find that the statute unambigu-
ously carried this meaning.400 The Fifth Circuit, however, was un-
convinced and declared the statute ambiguous, passing then to
Chevron step two.401
Notably, the Fifth Circuit found that Jurado Delgado did not
govern, as the BIA in that case answered the “narrow question” of
whether a noncitizen “could be charged with removal on one ground
and be ineligible for cancellation of removal because of another
ground.”402 The Fifth Circuit framed the issue before it in broader
terms, and proceeded to interrogate the operation of the stop-time
rule.403 Unbound by the agency interpretation that “render
inadmissible” meant that the individual could possibly be charged as
inadmissible, the Fifth Circuit concluded that the term “renders”
required that the noncitizen be convicted of the 1182(a)(2) offense after
commission.404 The Fifth Circuit found that Mr. Paz Calix’s convic-
tion for the marijuana offense “rendered” him inadmissible resulting
in the application of the stop-time rule at the time of commission in
2001, therefore making him ineligible for cancellation of removal.405
In Nguyen v. Sessions, the Ninth Circuit found a fundamental
flaw in the Fifth Circuit’s reasoning and arrived at a different con-
clusion.406 In that case, Vu Minh Nguyen entered the United States
as an LPR in 2000 and was placed in removal proceedings fifteen
years later based on three misdemeanor convictions.407 During re-
moval proceedings, Mr. Nguyen admitted to using cocaine in 2005,
which is a drug offense enumerated in 1182(a)(2).408 Accordingly, the
Immigration Judge found that the stop-time rule was triggered in
2005 and pretermitted his application for cancellation of removal,
a decision that was ultimately affirmed by the BIA.409 In reviewing
the agency determination, the Ninth Circuit emphasized the distinc-
tion between inadmissibility and deportability under immigration
law,410 and ultimately concluded that “[u]nder the plain language of
400. Id.
401. Id. at 1007.
402. Id. at 1009.
403. See Calix, 784 F.3d at 1011.
404. Id. at 1009, 1012.
405. Id. at 1011–12.
406. Nguyen v. Sessions, 901 F.3d 1093, 1099 (9th Cir. 2018) (finding that the Fifth
Circuit “dodged the surplusage problem by noting that different statutory sections of the
INA can be ‘difficult to harmonize’ . . . this is an impermissible reason to read super-
fluousness into a statute when applying the traditional rules of statutory construction
leads to a perfectly reasonable reading”).
407. Id. at 1095.
408. Id.
409. Id.
410. Id. at 1097.
2020] FAMILY IN THE BALANCE 81
the stop-time rule and the INA, a lawful permanent resident cannot
be ‘rendered inadmissible’ unless he is seeking admission.”411 The
government advanced three arguments based in the statute, and the
Ninth Circuit rejected each in turn.412
First the government argued that Mr. Nguyen was “rendered in-
admissible” upon commission of a crime enumerated in 1182(a)(2).413
The Ninth Circuit noted that this reading would make the second
part of the provision—that the commission of the 1182(a)(2) offense
“‘renders the alien inadmissible . . . or removable’—completely
unnecessary.”414 It is worth noting that this is a version of the sur-
plusage argument that the Fifth Circuit did not find persuasive in
Calix v. Lynch.415 The government next argued that the text of
1182(a)(2) declared that “any alien” who commits a crime enumer-
ated in that section “is inadmissible,” such that the commission of
such an offense would render the noncitizen inadmissible by opera-
tion of the statute.416 The Ninth Circuit also rejected this argument,
pointing to the header in § 1182 that describes “[c]lasses of aliens
ineligible for visas or admission,” and emphasizing once again that
LPRs have already been admitted and are only deemed inadmissible
in specific circumstances.417
Finally, the government argued that the Ninth Circuit owed
deference to the BIA’s interpretation in Jurado Delgado under
Chevron.418 However, the Ninth Circuit agreed with the Fifth Circuit
that the holding in Jurado Delgado was narrow and did not directly
address the question before the court.419 Notably, the Ninth Circuit
pointed to intervening BIA precedent that suggested alternative
interpretations of the stop-time rule.420 Moreover, the Ninth Circuit
found the Fifth Circuit’s rationale otherwise unpersuasive because
it had failed to adequately address the surplusage problem that had
been raised consistently ever since Jurado Delgado.421 Indeed, the
411. Id. at 1100.
412. Nguyen, 901 F.3d at 1097–99.
413. Id. at 1097.
414. Id.
415. Calix v. Lynch, 784 F.3d 1000, 1006 (5th Cir. 2015).
416. Nguyen, 901 F.3d at 1098.
417. Id. (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)).
418. Id. (citing Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984)).
419. Id. at 1098–99.
420. Id. at 1099 (citing In re Campos-Torres, 22 I&N Dec. 1289, 1294–95 (B.I.A. 2000)
(“[R]ejecting a reading of the stop-time rule that would make ‘referred to in section
[1182(a)(2)]’ meaningless.”); In re Garcia, 25 I&N Dec. 332, 335–36 (B.I.A. 2010) (“[H]old-
ing that an offense is not ‘referred to in section [1182(a)(2)]’ for the stop-time rule’s
purposes where it qualifies for the petty theft exception, which only applies to inad-
missibility grounds.”)).
421. Id. at 1099.
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Ninth Circuit was not willing to accept an interpretation of the
statute that rendered the second two operative clauses without any
legal effect.422 The contrary interpretations of the Fifth and Ninth
Circuits created a split on this important question.
B. The Supreme Court Resolves the Circuit Split
Barton v. Barr originated in the Eleventh Circuit, which noted
the circuit split in its opinion and explicitly disagreed with the Ninth
Circuit.423 Andre Martello Barton, a Jamaican national, was initially
admitted to the United States in May 1989, and adjusted status to
LPR three years later.424 In January 1996, Barton was charged with
three counts of aggravated assault, one count of first-degree crimi-
nal damage to property, and one count of possession of a firearm
during the commission of a felony.425 In July 1996, he was convicted
on all charges.426 A decade later, Barton was convicted of controlled
substances crimes in 2007 and 2008, and ultimately placed in re-
moval proceedings.427 While DHS initially charged Barton as re-
movable for his 1996, 2007, and 2008 crimes, Barton challenged the
1996 crimes as a basis for removal, and the government ultimately
relented.428 However, when Barton filed an application for cancella-
tion of removal, the government once again raised the 1996 crimes
which it could not use as a basis for charges of removability, but which
would serve as the basis for inadmissibility under § 1182(a)(2), trig-
gering the stop-time rule.429 The Immigration Judge agreed, preter-
mitting the cancellation application, and the BIA affirmed, relying on
Matter of Jurado Delgado.430
The Eleventh Circuit began its analysis with Chevron, and first
examined the ambiguity of the statute.431 The court used the dictio-
nary to examine the plain meaning of the relevant statutory terms
“renders” and “inadmissible,” and concluded that there was nothing
in these terms that required that a noncitizen actually be seeking
admission in order to be rendered inadmissible.432 Barton raised the
422. See Nguyen v. Sessions, 901 F.3d 1093, 1099 (9th Cir. 2018).
423. Barton v. Att’y Gen., 904 F.3d 1294, 1295 (11th Cir. 2018), cert. granted sub nom.
Barton v. Barr, 140 S. Ct. 1442 (2020).




428. Id. at 1297.
429. Barton, 904 F.3d at 1297.
430. Id.
431. Id. at 1297–98 (citing Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467
U.S. 837 (1984)).
432. Id. at 1298–99.
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surplusage argument that had prevailed at the Ninth Circuit, and
while the Eleventh Circuit found it “a little hard to follow,” the
argument was quite straight forward.433 Specifically, Barton argued
that if Congress had intended the mere commission of an 1182(a)(2)
offense to trigger the stop-time rule, then the statute only needed to
include the first clause.434 The Eleventh Circuit ultimately rejected
the surplusage argument for two reasons.435 First, the court found
it unnecessary to follow the rule against surplusage where the
purported surplus language would render an otherwise unambigu-
ous statute ambiguous.436 Second, and more in line with the Fifth
Circuit, the Eleventh Circuit found that commission of a 1182(a)(2)
crime fulfilled the first part of the statute, and conviction, admis-
sion, or admission of acts that constitute the essential elements of
the crime then “rendered” a noncitizen inadmissible.437 Accordingly,
the Eleventh Circuit found the rule against surplusage inapplica-
ble.438 The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Barton v. Barr to
resolve the split among the Circuits.439
In Barton v. Barr, the majority opinion of the Supreme Court,
authored by Justice Kavanaugh, held that cancellation of removal
is precluded when a noncitizen commits an offense referred to in
1182(a)(2) within the initial seven years.440 The Court upheld the
reasoning of the Eleventh Circuit (and the Fifth), in finding that it
is the subsequent conviction that “renders” the noncitizen inadmis-
sible and therefore disqualifies the noncitizen for cancellation of
removal.441 The Supreme Court further found that “[a]s a matter of
statutory text and structure, that analysis is straightforward,” and
noted that since Jurado Delgado, the BIA had interpreted the statute
in that manner.442 Notably, the majority did not deem it necessary
to apply the two-step Chevron analysis, notwithstanding the fact
that (unlike the Eleventh and Fifth Circuit) it did view this question
as identical to that addressed by the BIA in Jurado Delgado.443 The
433. Id. at 1300.
434. Id. at 1300–01.
435. Barton, 904 F.3d at 1301.
436. Id.
437. Id.
438. Id. at 1301–02.
439. Barton v. Barr, 140 S. Ct. 1442, 1445 (2020).
440. Id. at 1449–50 (finding that “the date of commission of the offense is the key date
for purposes of calculating whether the noncitizen committed a § 1182(a)(2) offense
during the initial seven years of residence”).
441. Id. at 1450 (citing Barton v. United States Att’y Gen., 904 F.3d 1294, 1301 (11th
Cir. 2018) (incorporating the Eleventh Circuit’s rationale that “while only commission
is required at step one, conviction (or admission) is required at step two”)).
442. Id. at 1450 (citing Jurado-Delgado, 24 I. & N. Dec., at 31).
443. Id. Presumably, the majority’s view that the “analysis is straightforward” meant
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majority defended its interpretation of the statute against the three
main arguments advanced by Barton.444
First, the Court addressed Barton’s argument that the overall
structure of the statute supports an interpretation that the 1182(a)(2)
offense must be the basis for removal in order to stop time for can-
cellation of removal.445 The Court disagreed and found Barton’s pur-
ported difficulty in explaining why Congress would not have in-
cluded additional statutory language to identify offenses “referred
to in section 1182(a)(2) or section 1227(a)(2)” to be the “Achilles’
heel” of this argument.446 Barton urged the Court to recognize that
inadmissibility and deportability are distinct statutory concepts
with different bases in the statute, and that Congress would have
understood this fundamental feature of immigration law.447 Indeed,
it is easy to understand why a statutory provision that applies to
non-LPRs, many of whom have not been admitted to the United
States, and LPRs who have all been lawfully admitted would be
structured this way. Indeed, a relatively easy way to understand the
statute is that it identifies a certain set of conduct, in this case
1182(a)(2) offenses, that will render all noncitizens seeking admission
ineligible for relief, but only preclude noncitizens from relief after
admission if the 1182(a)(2) offense is serious enough to render the
noncitizen deportable under 1227(a)(2) or 1227(a)(4).448 The majority
decided that a better way to make sense of the statute was to declare
it a “recidivist statute,” analogizing a humanitarian provision of
immigration law to a criminal law sentencing enhancement without
citation or support in legislative history or the statute itself.449
The dissent, authored by Justice Sotomayor, correctly pointed
out that the majority “conflat[ed]” the terms “inadmissible” and
that it did not consider the statute ambiguous, and it would have resolved the case at
Chevron step one in the same manner as the Eleventh Circuit. Id. This is worth noting,
however, because the Ninth Circuit found that the statute was not ambiguous under
Chevron but decided the statutory question differently. See Barton, 140 S. Ct. at 1446–48.
The Fifth Circuit for its part found the question was ambiguous, but applied its own
reasoning under Chevron step two after finding that the BIA’s holding in Jurado-
Delgado was narrow and did not resolve the question of the proper interpretation of the
statute. See id. at 1446–47.
444. Id. at 1451, 1453–54.
445. Id. at 1451.
446. Id. at 1452.
447. Id. at 1451.
448. See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)–(a)(4).
449. Barton, 140 S. Ct. at 1445–46 (explaining that “[i]f a lawful permanent resident
has ever been convicted of an aggravated felony, or has committed an offense listed in
§ 1182(a)(2) during the initial seven years of residence, that criminal record will preclude
cancellation of removal. In that way, the statute operates like traditional criminal recidi-
vist laws, which ordinarily authorize or impose greater sanctions on offenders who have
committed prior crimes”).
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“deportable,” leading to the “paradox[ical]” conclusion that one can be
already admitted to the country yet also “inadmissible.”450 The dissent
proceeded to break down the stop-time rule, noting the specific refer-
ences to inadmissibility and deportability,451 and that these are
terms of art that must be considered in the context of the statute.452
The opinion emphasized that the two-track system of exclusion and
deportation had long existed in immigration law and continued
under the statute which clearly differentiated between two catego-
ries of noncitizens.453 The distinction between these two tracks is
reflected throughout immigration law, for example noncitizens may
show inadmissibility by admitting to a crime, while deportability
requires convictions for most criminal grounds.454 The two tracks are
also reflected in the cancellation of removal statute, which requires
LPRs merely show relief is deserved as a matter of discretion and
non-LPRs must meet a heightened standard of exceptional and
extremely unusual hardship to an LPR or U.S. citizen family mem-
ber.455 Indeed, this distinction is fundamental to immigration law and
it is appropriate to read this distinction into the stop-time rule
which intended different standards for non-LPRs and LPRs.456
Second, the majority addressed Barton’s argument—that the
statute’s requirement that the 1182(a)(2) offense must “render” the
noncitizen inadmissible could only be fulfilled when the noncitizen
is actually charged with inadmissibility.457 Notably, these are rare
circumstances, but they clearly exist in the law.458 The majority, how-
ever, ignored this feature of immigration law and instead focused on
the fact that 1182(a)(2) declares that a noncitizen who commits an
enumerated offense “is inadmissible.”459 Here, the Supreme Court
ignored that the title of 1182 references noncitizens seeking admis-
sion, which Barton and other similarly situated LPRs are not.460




454. Id. at 1456 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
455. See Barton, 140 S. Ct. at 1456 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
456. Id.
457. Id. at 1453–54.
458. The six scenarios in which an LPR is deemed an applicant for admission are
codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(C)(i)–(vi). See, e.g., Heredia v. Sessions, 865 F.3d 60,
60–63 (2d Cir. 2017) (holding that an LPR returning from a trip to the Dominican Repub-
lic after having committed an 1182(a)(2) offense was appropriately deemed an applicant
for admission under the INA); see also In re Collado-Munoz, 21 I. & N. Dec. 1061,
1062–66 (B.I.A. 1998) (holding that IIRIRA overruled the equitable doctrine (“Fleuti
doctrine”) that had allowed LPRs to take innocent, casual, and brief trips abroad without
applying for admission upon their return).
459. Barton, 140 S. Ct. at 1452.
460. See id. at 1455 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
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Again, an LPR may be in a situation where she is seeking admis-
sion, which would make 1182 clearly applicable, but the majority
declined to address this inconvenient reality of the INA.461 Instead,
it analogized circumstances in which non-LPRs need to demonstrate
admissibility after an initial admission, such as when they apply for
LPR status,462 and ignored those limited situations in which LPRs
are actually subject to grounds of inadmissibility under the law.463
Finally, the Court addressed Barton’s argument that the Elev-
enth Circuit’s interpretation would render the language: “or remov-
able from the United States under section 1227(a)(2) or 1227(a)(4)
of this title” without effect, thereby violating the rule against sur-
plusage.464 The Court insisted that “[s]ometimes the better overall
reading of the statute contains some redundancy,”465 and declared
that to read the statute without redundancy would require the
Court to rewrite the statute.466 This claim, however, has no basis in
the statute. Indeed, the stop-time rule applies to both non-LPR and
LPR cancellation, meaning that the provision applies to some non-
citizens who are seeking admission, and some noncitizens who are
charged as deportable.467 The first clause draws into the purview of
the stop-time rule any noncitizen who has “committed ‘an offense
referred to in section 1182(a)(2),’” which applies to all non-LPRs and
LPRs.468 The second clause “that renders the alien inadmissible to
the United States under section 1182(a)(2)” applies on its terms to
all non-LPRs and LPRs who are seeking admission, recognizing im-
plicitly that LPRs seek admission only in limited circumstances.469
The third clause uses the word “or” to suggest an alternative, and
then limits cancellation of removal for noncitizens who are “remov-
able from the United States under section 1227(a)(2) or 1227(a)(4),”
which refer to non-LPRs and LPR who have been admitted, are not
seeking readmission, and are properly charged as deportable under
the referenced sections.470 Indeed, there is a way to read the statute
and give it its plain meaning—no “rewriting” required—but to do so
would have led the majority to a different conclusion which it was
evidently unwilling to draw.
461. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2).
462. Barton, 140 S. Ct. at 1452.
463. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2).
464. Barton, 140 S. Ct. at 1453.





470. Barton, 140 S. Ct. at 1453.
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The dissent was correct when it stated that: “[h]ad Congress
intended for commission of a crime in § 1182(a)(2) alone to trigger
the stop-time rule, it would have said so.”471 The rule against sur-
plusage was raised before every court to consider this question, but
only the Ninth Circuit and the dissent in Barr felt compelled to give
every clause of the stop-time rule meaning.472 Importantly, there is
another rule of statutory interpretation that would have aided these
courts in arriving at the correct interpretation of the stop-time rule.
That is the Charming Betsy rule of statutory interpretation, which
compels a court to read a statute in a manner consistent with cus-
tomary international law where possible.473 The application of the
Charming Betsy rule would have led the Supreme Court to permit
Barton and similarly situated noncitizens to present evidence of
their family life as part of their request for cancellation of removal.
C. The Charming Betsy Rule of Statutory Interpretation
This final section argues that customary international law
requires the individualized consideration of family life in decisions
to expel migrants, and that rule should have influenced the outcome
in Barton under the Charming Betsy rule of statutory interpreta-
tion. Indeed, the robust body of international human rights juris-
prudence presented above demonstrates the emergence of a norm
that meets the legal definition of customary international law.474
That norm, properly conceived, requires states to balance family life
in decisions to expel individuals for immigration or criminal law
violations.475 While the influence of international law in judicial
decision-making in the United States is at times controversial,
customary international law has an established pedigree in U.S.
jurisprudence.476 An internationalist conception of the Charming
Betsy rule of statutory interpretation is one established entry point
through which rules of customary international law may influence
471. Id. at 1460 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
472. See id. at 1455 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
473. See Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy (The Charming Betsy Case), 6 U.S. 64,
118 (1804).
474. See North Sea Continental Shelf (Ger. V. Den./Neth.), Judgement, 1969 I.C.J. 4,
53 (Feb. 20); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 102 (AM. L.
INST. 1987).
475. See supra Section II.B.
476. See The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 677 (1900); see also Ralph G. Steinhardt,
The Role of International Law as a Canon of Domestic Statutory Construction, 43 VAND.
L. REV. 1103, 1104 (1990); Harold Hongju Koh, Commentary, Is International Law Really
State Law?, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1824, 1824 (1998); Gerald L. Neuman, The Uses of Interna-
tional Law in Constitutional Interpretation, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 82, 82 (2004).
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the scope and meaning of federal statutes.477 Considering that what
was at stake in Barton was access to one of the limited means by
which immigration courts can consider a noncitizen’s family life in
the United States as a defense against removal, the Court should
have interpreted the statute in Barton’s favor.
Customary international law is one of the primary sources of
international law and is created when general patterns of state
practice or behavior emerge out of a sense of legal obligation.478 By
definition, customary international law is a fluid body of law that is
formed when practices become sufficiently widespread, as evidenced
by diplomatic or other governmental acts, public measures, or policy
statements.479 While a practice must be “general and consistent” to
form the basis of customary international law, it need not be univer-
sally followed, but there should be ample evidence of wide accep-
tance among states.480 Notably, such a practice must not only be
widespread to solidify as a norm of customary international law, but
states must follow the practice out of a sense of legal obligation,
commonly referred to as opinio juris.481 Just as it may be difficult to
identify the precise point when a practice becomes sufficiently wide-
spread, it can also be challenging to determine when states follow
a practice out of a sense of legal obligation.482 While public state-
ments are helpful in this regard, they are not necessary, and opinio
juris can also be inferred from acts or omissions.483
The best evidence that a norm of customary international law has
emerged to require the consideration of family life in individualized
expulsion decisions are the many treaty provisions cited above and the
authoritative interpretations that support this conclusion.484 The
European Court of Human Rights issues binding decisions with re-
gard to human rights obligations against all forty-seven Member
States of the Council of Europe that have ratified the European Con-
vention.485 Similarly, the Inter-American Commission has jurisdiction
477. Steinhardt, supra note 476, at 1112 (“[I]nternational law may penetrate domestic
law through the presumption that Congress intends to conform its statutes to interna-
tional standards.”).
478. See North Sea Continental Shelf (Ger. V. Den./Neth.), Judgement, 1969 I.C.J. 4,
53 (Feb. 20); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 102 cmt. B (AM.
L. INST. 1987).
479. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 102 cmt. B (AM. L.
INST. 1987).
480. Id.
481. Id. at cmt. C.
482. Id.
483. See id.
484. See supra Part II.
485. DAVID BALUARTE & CHRISTIAN DE VOS, FROM JUDGMENT TO JUSTICE: IMPLE-
MENTING INTERNATIONAL AND REGIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS DECISIONS 15, 17 (2010).
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over all thirty-five Member States of the Organization of American
States, and issues authoritative interpretations of Inter-American
human rights instruments in its reports and decisions.486 The Hu-
man Rights Committee similarly issues authoritative interpretations
of the ICCPR, which currently has 173 states party to the conven-
tion who are obliged to abide by the decisions of the HRC.487 The
body of family life jurisprudence of these three human rights insti-
tutions spans years and covers a wide range of scenarios in which
states have used their authority to expel noncitizens in violation of
their human rights obligations.488 The review of relevant jurispru-
dence looks at the expulsion of noncitizens who have no immigration
status as well as those who have immigration status but who are
nevertheless ordered expelled due to criminal law violations.489
Notably, while there are differences of opinion about when family
life will compel a state to allow noncitizens who have otherwise run
afoul of immigration laws, there is consensus that some opportunity
must exist to advance the family life of a nuclear family as a defense
against expulsion.490
The practice of considering family life as part of expulsion de-
cisions, whether the state’s ultimate decision is to expel or not, is
both “general and consistent,” such that it meets the first prong of
the test to establish customary international law.491 Evidently, the
practice is not universally followed, but through the decisions of
international human rights bodies that operate in the majority of
countries in the world states have recognized that noncitizens’ family
life grounded in their territory must be considered.492 This recogni-
tion meets the second requirement for the establishment of custom-
ary international law that states perform the act out of a sense of
legal obligation.493 Through their adhesion to the various human
rights regimes that have evolved in the image of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, states have come to recognize both
that the family is a fundamental building block of society and that
family unity is a basic human right.494 In order to respect this right
envisioned by numerous human rights treaties, states have created
486. Id. at 63–64.
487. UN Status of Ratification Interactive Dashboard, available at https://indicators
.ohchr.org [https://perma.cc/N28C-6UC9].
488. See supra Part II.
489. Id.
490. Id.
491. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW OF FOREIGNRELATIONS § 102 (AM.L.INST.1987).
492. UN Status of Ratification Interactive Dashboard, supra note 487.
493. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 102 cmt. E (AM. L.
INST. 1987).
494. Abrams, supra note 105, at 630.
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mechanisms to consider family life as a reflection of their under-
standing that they must balance this right against the states own
interests in maintaining orderly migration, public safety, and the
security of the national territory.495 The right of family members to
be together, free from arbitrary state interference, need not be incon-
sistent with the state interests; indeed, the law only requires that
states balance these interests and give them due consideration.496
To date, only a handful of U.S. courts have addressed this issue,
but these decisions support the conclusion that a norm of customary
international law has evolved along these lines.497 In INS v. St. Cyr,
the Supreme Court limited the retroactive effect of IIRAIRA’s elimi-
nation of 212(c) relief and the application of mandatory deportation
to persons who had committed offenses deemed aggravated felonies,
but made no reference to international law.498 Prior to that decision,
Eddy Maria challenged the retroactive application of AEDPA’s re-
classification of his second degree attempted theft conviction as an
aggravated felony and IIRAIRA’s subsequent elimination of 212(c)
relief.499 The District Court in Maria v. McElroy emphasized that
“[a]n act of Congress should be construed in accordance with in-
ternational law where it is possible to do so without distorting the
statute,” and found that “retroactive deprivation of Mr. Maria’s statu-
tory right to humanitarian relief from deportation would arguably
be contrary to both the [ICCPR] and customary international hu-
man rights law.”500 After review of major sources of international
law, the court concluded that “[t]he rights to be free from arbitrary
interference with family life and from arbitrary expulsion are hu-
man rights that are part of customary international law that must
be followed by the United States.”501 The court held that Mr. Maria
must have access to 212(c) relief so that he could advance family life
as a defense against removal.502
After the U.S. Supreme Court limited the retroactivity of
IIRAIRA’s elimination of 212(c) in St. Cyr, the same District Court
495. Id. at 655, 673–74.
496. Maria v. McElroy, 68 F. Supp. 2d 206, 233 (E.D.N.Y. 1999).
497. Abrams, supra note 105, at 247–48.
498. See INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 321 (2001).
499. Maria, 68 F. Supp. 2d at 231 (citing Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 887 n.20
(2d Cir. 1980) (quoting Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy (The Charming Betsy Case),
6 U.S. 64, 67 (1804)); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 114 (Am. L.
Inst. 1987) (“Where fairly possible, a United States statute is to be construed so as not
to conflict with international law or with an international agreement of the United
States.”), abrogated by Restrepo v. McElroy, 369 F.3d 627, 640 (2d Cir. 2004).
500. Id.
501. Id. at 233.
502. Id. at 234.
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that decided Maria extended its international law rationale to permit
a noncitizen to seek discretionary relief from removal, notwithstand-
ing apparent ineligibility.503 In Beharry v. Reno, Don Beharry was
convicted of robbery months after the passage of the 1996 acts and
deemed deportable for an aggravated felony.504 Mr. Beharry argued
that he should have access to discretionary relief because he had
committed his crime before the passage of the 1996 acts and there-
fore acted in reliance on the laws in place at that time.505 The Dis-
trict Court ruled “in light of St. Cyr, international law and other
considerations [such as public policy], . . . the operative time from
which to define retroactivity under the [INA] is the moment the
crime was committed.”506 While the court found that 212(c) was
unavailable to Mr. Beharry because it had been eliminated entirely
in 1996, it noted that 212(h) waiver still existed under the law.507
The court recognized that the 1996 legislation made the 212(h) waiver
unavailable to LPRs who had been convicted of an aggravated
felony, but that to preclude Mr. Beharry’s access to that discretion-
ary relief would violate U.S. international obligations relating to
family life and special protections for children.508 The court found
that the Charming Betsy rule requires that courts construe statutes
in compliance with international law, and that 212(h) is “the most
narrowly targeted way to bring the INA into compliance with inter-
national law requirements.”509 The court therefore held that 212(h)
was available to Mr. Beharry because his crime predated the 1996
amendments that made 212(h) unavailable to him because of his
aggravated felony.510
While the District Court’s international law analysis in Maria
and Beharry was never sustained on review, the Second Circuit
never specifically undermined the finding that family life protection
had attained the status of customary international law.511 Moreover,
the Charming Betsy rule of statutory interpretation that the District
Court advanced in those cases is based on a centuries-old line of
503. Beharry v. Reno, 183 F. Supp. 2d 584, 604–05 (E.D.N.Y. 2002), rev’d sub nom.
Beharry v. Ashcroft, 329 F.3d 51 (2d Cir. 2003).
504. Id. at 603.
505. Id.
506. Id. at 605.
507. Id. at 592 (recalling that 212(h) “allows waiver of deportation under special
circumstances for aliens whose deportation would result in substantial hardship to a
citizen spouse or children”).
508. Id. at 604–05.
509. Beharry, 183 F. Supp. 2d at 604.
510. Id.
511. See Beharry v. Ashcroft, 329 F.3d 51, 63 (2d Cir. 2003) (holding that Mr. Beharry
had not administratively exhausted his 212(h) argument).
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jurisprudence and should appropriately factor into judicial interpre-
tations of statutory provisions implicated in mandatory deporta-
tion.512 Ralph Steinhardt has argued that “[a]s the international
legal system addresses more substantive aspects of economic and
political life . . . the Charming Betsy principle should take on a
heightened practical and theoretical significance.”513 David Cole and
Harold Koh have resonated with this view, arguing that federal
courts should interpret statutes in a manner consistent with inter-
national law in accordance with the Charming Betsy doctrine.514 Of
course, contrary views abound,515 and those who argue that this
invocation of Charming Betsy is misguided have accurately observed
the disinclination of many courts to apply this “internationalist”
view of the doctrine in a consistent manner to advance international
human rights norms.516 Unfortunately, these contrary views antici-
pated the outcome in Barton v. Barr, at least with regard to the role
of Charming Betsy and customary international law in the consider-
ation of the Court.
One might assume from the reasoning of the majority opinion
in Barton v. Barr that an invocation of the customary international
law norm that requires consideration of family life in expulsion
decisions would have fallen on deaf ears. Nevertheless, the absence
of this discussion from the litigation entirely is perhaps a more
troubling commentary on the role of international law in contempo-
rary judicial decision-making. The dissent in Barton argued persua-
sively that a faithful reading of the stop-time rule under the rule
against surplusage favored giving Mr. Barton the opportunity to
512. See Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy (The Charming Betsy Case), 6 U.S. 64,
115 (1804); see also The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. at 677; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 114 (Am. L. Inst. 1987).
513. Steinhardt, supra note 476, at 1197.
514. David Cole, The Idea of Humanity: Human Rights and Immigrants’ Rights, 37
COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 627, 646 (2006) (arguing that “absent a clear conflict, courts
should interpret federal statutes to conform to international law obligations”); Harold
Hongju Koh, International Law as Part of Our Law, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 43, 44 (2004)
(invoking the Charming Betsy decision in support of the contention that the early Su-
preme Court “promoted the implicit or explicit internalization of international law into
U.S. domestic law through statutory construction”).
515. See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley, The Charming Betsy Canon and Separation of Powers:
Rethinking the Interpretive Role of International Law, 86 GEO. L.J. 479, 492 (1998).
516. Curtis A. Bradley, Chevron Deference and Foreign Affairs, 86 VA.L.REV. 649, 690
(2000) (citing a line of cases which ultimately did not follow customary international law
in resolving challenges to mandatory immigrant detention: Barrera-Echavarria v. Rison,
44 F.3d 1441, 1451 (9th Cir. 1995); Gisbert v. United States Attorney Gen., 988 F.2d 1437,
1448 (5th Cir. 1993); Garcia-Mir v. Meese, 788 F.2d 1446, 1453 (11th Cir. 1986)). But see
Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 505 F. Supp. 787, 799–800 (D. Kan. 1980), aff’d, 654 F.2d 1382
(10th Cir. 1981)).
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seek discretionary relief from removal.517 Absent from that opinion
is any mention that a rule of customary international law that
requires the consideration of family life as part of the decision to
remove Mr. Barton, and no party to the litigation invoked Charming
Betsy to urge the Court’s consideration of this rule. Nevertheless,
this doctrine supports the dissent’s view that the statute should
have been interpreted to give every clause of the stop-time rule
effect, inasmuch as that interpretation of the statute would have
been consistent with the customary international law obligation to
provide Mr. Barton the opportunity to invoke family life as a defense
against removal.518 Ultimately, the Supreme Court should have recog-
nized this fundamental human rights protection and interpreted the
statute to give it effect.
CONCLUSION
The United States systematically violates the human right to
family life of noncitizens in removal proceedings inasmuch as it
denies broadly defined categories of persons the opportunity to seek
discretionary relief from removal to keep their families unified in
the United States. The elimination of various forms of discretionary
relief from removal in 1996 and the replacement of those forms of
relief with cancellation of removal, with its many limitations and
bars to relief, brought the United States out of compliance with its
international obligations. This situation has persisted for nearly
twenty-five years, and the brutality and irreparable harm that has
been wrought on the lives of millions of noncitizens and their U.S.
citizen family members is unquantifiable.
The existence of this draconian system and its abusive rules
does not relieve courts of the responsibility to comply with interna-
tional obligations when the law permits. Indeed, while mandatory
removal of some noncitizens may be inevitable under the existing
removal regime, some statutory provisions are open to interpreta-
tion, and interpretations that comply with human rights obligations
are often possible. The Charming Betsy doctrine has long existed as
a mandate for courts to interpret statutes in a manner consistent
with international legal obligations, and that is precisely what courts
must do when a removal statute is open to interpretation. Where it
is possible for courts to read such a statute in a manner that would
permit a noncitizen to seek discretionary relief and present a defense
517. See Barton v. Barr, 140 S. Ct 1442, 1461 (2020) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
518. Id.
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against removal based on the human right to family life, courts
must interpret the law to permit that option.
In Barton v. Barr, the U.S. Supreme Court failed in this regard.
The Court had a duty under the law to interpret the stop-time rule
in a manner that would have provided Mr. Barton with the opportu-
nity to seek discretionary relief from removal based on his and his
family’s human right to family life. In failing to do so, the Court
further expanded the reach of the mandatory removal regime and
callously cemented an interpretation of the law that will tear many
more families apart without a real opportunity to seek justice in
court. Congress must now act to bring the removal system back into
compliance with human rights obligations to protect family life.
